De a poco, sin gritos, sin grandes anuncios, un poco como si fueran charlas de pasillo, los rumores se extienden más allá de los cuartos en donde se deciden las cosas. Pasan a otros sitios, reverberan en otras voces, se comentan en otras audiencias. De a poco, muy de a poco. Leemos en Zero Hedge de hoy:
Título: World
Ponders Life After US Hegemony
Texto: Over the
past several months, we’ve argued that between the collapse of petrodollar
mercantilism and the rise of a China-led, yuan-influenced multinational
development bank, the days of dollar hegemony are likely numbered. The
implications of the shift away from a global economic order that has prevailed
since the end of WWII are far reaching and may include the demise of what has
largely been a unilateral political and economic order characterized by the
dominance of US foreign policy and Western notions of politics and capitalism.
Now, it appears as though de-dollarization and the end of US hegemony may have
gone viral. As The NY Times reports, a US “retreat” from the world order it has
largely shaped was the unspoken topic de jour at this year’s spring meeting of
the IMF and World Bank in Washington.
Via NY Times:
The spring
meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank have filled
Washington with motorcades and traffic jams and loaded the schedules of
President Obama and Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew. But they have also
highlighted what some in Washington and around the world see as a United States
government so bitterly divided that it is on the verge of ceding the global economic
stage it built at the end of World War II and has largely directed ever since.
“It’s almost
handing over legitimacy to the rising powers,” Arvind Subramanian, the chief
economic adviser to the government of India, said of the United States in an interview
on Friday. “People can’t be too public about these things, but I would argue
this is the single most important issue of these spring meetings.”
Other officials
attending the meetings this week, speaking on the condition of anonymity,
agreed that the role of the United States around the world was at the top of
their concerns.
There’s no
question that The White House has had a difficult time projecting a unified
front of late. Between Israel’s attempt to foment discord in Congress amid
nuclear talks between US and Iranian officials and Washington’s abject failure
to convince its allies to refrain from joining the newly formed Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank, it certainly appears as though the US
government faces a fractious relationship not only between its two dominant
political parties, but between itself and its external allies as well, and this
is serving to undercut its ability to preserve America’s traditionally dominant
position on the world stage. There’s perhaps no better example of this than the
failure to make changes to the structure of the IMF, an institution which will
now face a Chinese rival in the AIIB that could, given enough time, rise to
become one of the world’s foremost multinational institutions:
Washington’s
retreat is not so much by intent, Mr. Subramanian said, but a result of
dysfunction and a lack of resources to project economic power the way it once
did. Because of tight budgets and competing financial demands, the United
States is less able to maintain its economic power, and because of political
infighting, it has been unable to formally share it either.
Experts say that
is giving rise to a more chaotic global shift, especially toward China, which
even Obama administration officials worry is extending its economic influence
in Asia and elsewhere without following the higher standards for environmental
protection, worker rights and business transparency that have become the norms
among Western institutions…
An overhaul of
the I.M.F.’s governance structure, negotiated five years ago in large part by
President Obama to give China and other emerging powers more authority
commensurate with their growing economic strength, has languished in Congress.
That, in part, propelled China to create its own multilateral lending
institution in direct competition with the behemoths in Washington.
And as we’ve
argued exhaustively, the AIIB represents far more than a competing
infrastructure lender. It represents the ascendancy of Chinese foreign policy
and also ushers in a new era wherein the yuan charts a gradual course towards
reserve currency status.
For much of
Washington and the world’s economic leaders, China’s creation of the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank crystallized the choice policy makers face. Earlier
this month, Lawrence Summers, who was a top economic adviser for both President
Bill Clinton and Mr. Obama, declared that China’s establishment of a new
economic institution and Washington’s failure to keep its allies from joining
it signaled “the moment the United States lost its role as the underwriter of
the global economic system.”
For years, China
had threatened to establish institutions to rival those dominated by the West,
like the I.M.F., World Bank and Asian Development Bank — or even to establish
its currency, the renminbi, as a reserve currency to rival the dollar.
But even as the
some observers describe the situation as a “withdrawal” by the US from the
world stage, it may indeed be that Washington has simply lost its legitimacy
after years of foreign policy “missteps” that have now culminated in multiple
proxy wars across the Middle East and after mishandling China’s rise to
superpower status by painting Beijing as a quasi-threat rather than adapting to
a changing world order in a way that secured US interests while demonstrating
an ability to respond appropriately to a changing geopolitical landscape.
Whatever the
case, the effect has been to undercut Washington’s traditionally dominant role
in the financial and political affairs of the world and has, for better or
worse, opened the door for other powerful actors to try their hand at shaping
the course of history unencumbered by the weight of an overbearing Western
hegemon. We're seeing this play out both in Europe — where Russia's Vladimir
Putin is not only looking to reshape borders but also to serve as a lender of
last resort to Greece — and also in Asia — where, even amid decelerating
economic output, Beijing has been agressive in projecting both economic and
military prowess over the past several months. Meanwhile, the consequences of
US foreign policy continue to materialize in the form of failed or
nearly-failed states, and so at the end of the day we'll leave it to readers to
decide if the new world order is preferable to its predecessor.
Creo que el ascenso geopolítico de China y Rusia no tiene que ver con amenazar a nadie ni desafiar a nadie, sino con la crisis de desintegración monetaria y financiera global, la que ha sido administrada y gestionada exclusivamente por el sector angloamericano noroccidental.
ResponderEliminarSi otras hubieran sido las alternativas políticas para salir de la crisis (salvatajes financieros, austeridad presupuestaria, aumento de deudas, derivados, etc., etc.), no hubiera existido la amenaza geopolítica a Oriente y China y Rusia se hubieran comportado de otra manera.
Pero la reacción de ellos es totalmente racional y natural, en la medida que pretenden mantener un compromiso (aunque sea mínimo) con sus propios pueblos, ya que ven que la crisis y la manera de administrarla por los poderes noroccidentales (con su núcleo hegemónico angloamericano) conduce al desastre social que están viviendo esos países noroccidentales.
Se trata en el caso de China y Rusia de una reacción natural de protección y preservación, tendiente a evitar que las oligarquías occidentales le impongan el pago de las cuotas que les corresponden para pagar la crisis.
Comos sacan los pies del plato, se concreta la amenaza geopolítica y militar en su contra. Y, el fundamento de esa amenaza no radica en países (sea USA o GB) sino en el núcleo de combinaciones oligárquicas que los controlan.