jueves, 12 de febrero de 2015
Empiezan a conocerse detalles de lo que ya se conoce como Acuerdos de Minsk 2.0. Así lo anunciaba hoy la versión española de Russia Today:
Título: Putin: "Acordamos una tregua en Ucrania a partir del 15 de febrero"
Texto: Tras 16 horas de negociaciones en 'formato de Normandía' (Rusia, Alemania, Francia y Ucrania), el presidente ruso, Vladímir Putin, anunció en Minsk que las partes han acordado una tregua a partir del 15 de febrero.
El presidente ruso dijo ante la prensa que el grupo de contacto ha firmado un documento sobre las medidas destinadas a la aplicación del acuerdo de Minsk. Además, Putin dijo que en Minsk se acordó una declaración en la que los mandatarios reunidos en ‘formato de Normandía’ muestran su apoyo a este proceso.
Putin anunció que también se ha acordado la retirada del armamento pesado de la zona en conflicto: Kiev retirará su armamento de la actual línea de frente, mientras que las autodefensas trasladarán su técnica militar hasta la línea del frente del 19 de septiembre.
Según el líder ruso, para alcanzar la paz en Donbass resultan imprescindibles contactos directos entre Kiev y las Repúblicas Populares de Donetsk y Lugansk.
Putin se mostró esperanzado en que las partes logren un alto el fuego definitivo en Ucrania a fin de evitar el derramamiento de sangre.
Título: Los 13 puntos clave del histórico acuerdo sobre Ucrania
Texto: Tras más de 16 horas de negociaciones sobre el conflicto en Ucrania, el presidente ruso, Vladímir Putin, se dirigió a los periodistas y anunció que se ha firmado un acuerdo que consta de 13 puntos entre los que destaca un cese el fuego que entrará en vigor a las 00 horas del 15 de febrero.
Estas son las claves del acuerdo alcanzado por los mandatarios de Rusia, Francia, Alemania y Ucrania durante las conversaciones de Minsk:
1. Un alto el fuego inmediato y completo en zonas concretas de las regiones de Donetsk y Lugansk de Ucrania y su aplicación estricta a partir de las 00 h. 00 min. (tiempo de Kiev) del 15 de febrero de 2015.
2. La retirada del armamento pesado de ambas partes a una distancia equitativa con el fin de crear una zona de seguridad de al menos 50 kilómetros entre los sistemas de artillería de calibre igual o superior a los 100 milímetros, una zona de 70 kilómetros entre los sistemas de lanzamisiles múltiples y una de 140 kilómetros entre los sistemas tipo 'Tornado-S', 'Uragan', 'Smerch' y los sistemas de misiles tácticos 'Tochka' (Tochka-U').
- Para las tropas ucranianas desde la línea real de frente.
- Para las fuerzas armadas de las distintas zonas de las regiones de Donetsk y Lugansk de Ucrania a partir de la línea de frente de conformidad con el memorando de Minsk del 19 de septiembre 2014
La retirada de las armas pesadas mencionadas anteriormente comenzará no más tarde del segundo día después del alto el fuego y se terminará es un plazo de 14 días.
3. Se garantizará el seguimiento y la verificación eficaz del alto el fuego y la retirada de las armas pesadas por parte de la OSCE desde el primer día de la retirada, haciendo uso de todos los medios necesarios, incluidos satélites, aviones no tripulados, sistemas de radar entre otros.
4. En el primer día después de la retirada se iniciará un diálogo sobre las condiciones parallevar a cabo elecciones locales de acuerdo con la legislación de Ucrania y la Ley de Ucrania "Sobre el orden temporal de los gobiernos locales en algunas jurisdicciones de las regiones de Donetsk y Lugansk", así como el funcionamiento futuro de estas áreas sobre la base de la Ley.
5. Proporcionar indultos y amnistías a través de la promulgación de una ley que prohíba la persecución y castigo de las personas en relación con los sucesos que tuvieron lugar en algunas zonas de las regiones de Ucrania de Donetsk y Lugansk.
6. Asegurar la liberación y el intercambio de rehenes y detenidos ilegalmente en base al principio de "todos por todos". Este proceso debe completarse a más tardar el quinto día después de la retirada.
7. Proporcionar un acceso, entrega, almacenamiento y distribución seguros de asistencia humanitaria a los necesitados, sobre la base de un mecanismo internacional.
8. Determinar las condiciones para la plena restauración de las relaciones socioeconómicas, incluidas las ayudas sociales, como las pensiones y otros pagos (embolsos e ingresos, el pago puntual de todas las facturas de servicios públicos, la renovación de la tributación en el marco legal de Ucrania).
9. Establecimiento de un control total sobre la frontera estatal por parte del Gobierno ucraniano a lo largo de toda la zona del conflicto, que deberá comenzar ya el día después de la celebración de elecciones locales y acabar tras un acuerdo político completo.
10. Retirada de todas los grupos armados extranjeros, el equipo militar y los mercenarios del territorio de Ucrania bajo la supervisión de la OSCE. Desarme de todos los grupos ilegales.
11. Realización de una reforma constitucional en Ucrania con la entrada en vigor a finales de 2015 de una nueva Constitución que prevea la descentralización como un elemento clave y la aprobación de una ley permanente sobre el estatus particular de determinadas zonas de las regiones de Donetsk y Lugansk.
12. La organización de las elecciones locales se discutirá y acordará con los representantes de zonas determinadas de las regiones de Donetsk y Lugansk en el marco del grupo de contacto tripartito. Las elecciones se celebrarán cumpliendo con las normas pertinentes de la OSCE.
13. Intensificar la actividad del grupo de contacto tripartito. De forma particular mediante la creación de grupos de trabajo a fin de poner en práctica los aspectos pertinentes del acuerdo de Minsk.
Las opiniones (diversas) en relación a estos acuerdos no se han hecho esperar. Acá va la nota que postea la gente del blog The Vineyard of the Saker:
Título: The Minsk "Agreement"
Por: Alexander Mercouris
Texto: Already there is debate about who has "won" and who has "lost" in the Minsk talks.
The short answer is that as the German foreign minister Steinmeier correctly said there is no breakthrough but the Russians and the NAF have made progress.
One point needs to be explained or reiterated (since I have explained it already and many times).
The agreement does not make provision for federalisation or autonomy for the Donbass but still only refers to the grant of a law according the Donbass temporary special status within the Ukraine.
There could not be an agreement for federalisation out of the Minsk negotiations because they are primarily a summit meeting of five powers - Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, German and France. The Russians have always insisted that this is an internal conflict and civil war within the Ukraine and between Ukrainians and it is for the Ukrainians and them alone to resolve their internal differences between them through negotiations.
Given that this is Russia's stance, Russia and the other powers cannot impose a federalisation scheme on the Ukrainians and they have not - at least overtly - sought to do so. What the stated objective of the Minsk talks is - at least from the Russian point of view - is to set up conditions and a process for the constitutional negotiations that the Russians have been pushing for (and which were supposedly agreed on 21st February 2014 and on 17th April 2014 and 5th September 2014) to take place.
The Russians have been insisting on these negotiations since the February coup. The Russians are not publicly pre-ordaining the outcome of those negotiations because were they to do so they would not be negotiations at all. Whatever a negotiation is, it is by definition not something whose outcome is preordained.
If the Russians sought to preordain the outcome of the negotiations by insisting on federalisation as the outcome they would be imposing their views on the parties and would be admitting that they are a party to the conflict, which is what they have consistently said they are not. They would in effect be doing what the US has tried to do in the Syrian conflict, which is insist on an outcome to negotiations (Assad's resignation) before negotiations even take place. The Russians have always opposed this sort of behaviour and they are being consistent in not openly adopting it now.
Depending on what the parties agree between them, the negotiations could in theory result in decentralisation, federalisation, a confederation or even outright independence for the Donbass (the Russians floated that idea as a serious possibility in the summer). The latter is not by the way contrary to the reaffirmation of respect or even support for the Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity that we saw in the statement today. If the internal parties to the conflict were to decide on a formal partition as the solution to the Ukraine's conflict, then international actors like Russia could recognise it without calling into question their previous declared support for the Ukraine's territorial integrity, as they previously did when Czechoslovakia split up.
In reality everybody knows that the Russians' preferred option is federalisation and the Europeans are now edging towards that solution. Whether it is a viable solution is another matter.
Once this key point is understood everything else starts to fall into place.
Last spring and summer the Russians sought a ceasefire so the constitutional negotiations could begin. The Europeans are now also demanding a ceasefire (they were less keen on the idea last spring and summer). There is now therefore an agreement for a ceasefire.
Back in August the Russians demanded the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the Donbass. There is now an agreement for the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the Donbass.
If that happens it will be a major weakening of the Junta's position in the Donbass because it is the Junta whose military has the big preponderance in heavy weapons. If the opposing sides are left with light infantry forces, the advantage on the ground will pass decisively to the NAF.
The political machinery that was supposed to have been agreed in Minsk on 5th September 2014 to create the conditions for the constitutional elections is being revived. Thus there is to be a law of special status for the Donbass pending the constitutional negotiations to clarify its current legal status and provide legal mechanisms for its internal administration by the NAF (Ukraine passed one previously and then reneged on it), more elections etc.
There is a new provision, which is the first indications of some sort of timeline for this process with the constitutional negotiations supposed to have been concluded by the end of the year.
There are also some ideas for a beefed up monitoring process via the OSCE.
Will any of this happen? Highly doubtful I would say. Consider what happened after the Minsk process of 5th September 2014. The Junta did not withdraw its heavy weapons. It did not retreat to the agreed boundary line. It imposed an economic blockade on the Donbass (it is now obliged to lift it). It rescinded the law on the Donbass's special status. It reinforced its army and in January it attempted to renew its offensive.
Is there any more prospect of this process succeeding than did the one that was agreed in Minsk in September?
The big difference between this process and the previous process is that the Europeans are now formally involved. Its success or failure ultimately depends on whether the Europeans are going to insist on the Junta fulfilling its obligations. They spectacularly failed to do so before and I have to say I think it is very unlikely they will do so now. If the Europeans fail to insist on the Junta fulfilling its obligations then the process will unravel as the previous Minsk process did and with the balance of advantage continuing to shift every day on the ground towards the NAF we will see a further renewal of the fighting and a further NAF advance in the spring.
In the meantime control of the border, disarmament of "illegal armed groups" etc are now overtly linked to the successful conclusion of the constitutional negotiations, which is supposed to happen before the end of the year. Of course if the constitutional negotiations succeed, then when all these things happen we will have a different Ukraine from the one we have now. At that point the control of border posts etc will be in the hands of differently constituted authorities from those that exist today.
Will those negotiations actually happen? Will they succeed if they do? I doubt it. The Junta will resist them tooth and nail if only because those negotiations put in jeopardy the whole Maidan project and by their mere fact call into question the Junta's legitimacy.
It depends in the end on what the Europeans do. This has been true of the conflict from the start.
That it depends on what the Europeans do is in itself a good reason to doubt this process will succeed. The probability is more conflict down the road but in the meantime Poroshenko's admission that there is "no good news for the Ukraine" from this process tells us who is winning.
Y ahora, el texto completo de los acuerdos Minsk 2.0 (versión en inglés):
(According to the Financial Times, the following is based on a translation of the Russian document):
Complex of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreement
1. Immediate and comprehensive ceasefire in certain areas in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine and strict implementation of it starting at 00.00, Kiev time, February 15th
2. Withdrawal of all heavy weapons by both parties at equal distances to create a security zone of at least 50km from each other for artillery systems of 100mm calibre or more, a security zone 70km wide for multiple-launch rocket systems and a security zone 140km wide for multiple-launch rocket systems Tornado, Uragan, Smerch and tactical missile systems Tochka.
For the Ukrainian troops these distances apply from the actual line of contact. For the armed forces of certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine they apply from the contact line in accordance with the Minsk memorandum of September 19th, 2014.
Withdrawal of heavy weapons above shall begin no later than the second day after the start of the ceasefire and be completed within 14 days.
The OSCE, with the support of the Three-Party Contact Group, will contribute to this process.
3. The effective monitoring and verification of the ceasefire and the withdrawal of heavy weapons will be ensured from the side of the OSCE from the first day of the withdrawal, with the help of all necessary means including satellites, drones, radar systems etc.
4. On the first day after the withdrawal a dialogue is to begin on the modalities of local elections in accordance with Ukrainian law and [in particular] Ukrainian Law ‘On the temporary regime of local government in some areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions’, as well as on how these areas are to be run in the future on the basis of that law.
Immediately and not later than 30 days from the date of signing of this document, a resolution is to be adopted in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine indicating the territories covered by the special regime in accordance with the Ukrainian Law ‘On the temporary regime of local government in some areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions’, based on the line set in the Minsk memorandum of September 19th, 2014.
5. Pardons and amnesties will be granted through the enactment of a law prohibiting the prosecution and punishment of persons in connection with the events that took place in some areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine.
6. Hostages and illegally detained persons will be released and exchanged based on the principle ‘all for all’. This process must be completed no later than the fifth day after the withdrawal.
7. Provide secure access, delivery, storage and distribution of humanitarian assistance to the needy on the basis of an international mechanism.
8. Determination of the modalities of the full restoration of socio-economic relations, including social transfers such as pensions and other payments (receipts and income, timely payment of all utility bills, renewal of taxation within the legal framework of Ukraine).
To this end, Ukraine will regain control of the parts of its banking system in conflict-affected areas, and there will possibly be an international mechanism to facilitate such transfers.
9. Restoration of full control over the state border of Ukraine by the government throughout the conflict zone, which should begin on the first day after the local elections and be completed after a comprehensive political settlement (local elections in some areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions on the basis of the Law of Ukraine and constitutional reform) at the end of 2015, subject to paragraph 11 — in consultation and agreement with the representatives of individual areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions in the framework of the Three-Party Contact Group.
10. Withdrawal of all foreign armed forces, military equipment, as well as mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine under the supervision of the OSCE. Disarmament of all illegal groups.
11. Constitutional reform will be conducted in Ukraine, and a new constitution will enter into force by the end of 2015 which is intended as a key element of decentralisation (taking into account the special characteristics of certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions as agreed with representatives of these areas). Also a permanent law is to be adopted by the end of 2015 on the special status of certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions in accordance with the measures specified in Note .
12. On the basis of the Law of Ukraine ‘On the temporary regime of local government in some areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions’ questions regarding local elections will be discussed and agreed with certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions in the framework of the Three-Party Contact Group. Elections will be held in compliance with the relevant standards of the OSCE in monitoring by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.
13. To intensify the activities of the Three-Party Contact Group, including through the establishment of working groups to implement the relevant aspects of the Minsk Agreement. They will reflect the composition of the Three-Party Contact Group.
Such measures, in accordance with the Law ‘On the temporary regime of local government in certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions’ include the following:
— Exemption from punishment, harassment and discrimination of individuals associated with the events that took place in some areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions;
— The right to self-determination of language;
— Participation of local governments in the appointment of heads of prosecutors and courts in certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions;
— The possibility for the central executive authorities to conclude with the relevant local authorities an agreement on economic, social and cultural development of certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions;
— The State shall support socio-economic development of certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions;
— Assistance from the central government for cross-border co-operation in selected areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions and the regions of the Russian Federation;
— The creation of people’s militia units to address local councils in order to maintain public order in certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions;
— The powers of local council deputies and officers elected in early elections, appointed by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on this law, cannot be terminated.
Signed by the participants of the Three-Party Contact Group:
Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini
The second President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma
Ambassador of the Russian Federation, to Ukraine Mikhail Zurabov