En sus esfuerzos
por continuar a cualquier costo el status de hiperpotencia en un mundo
unipolar, los EEUU favorecieron alianzas entre Rusia, China e Irán que
implicaron la consolidación de un equilibrio (temporal) bipolar. Tal es la
conclusión de Federico Pieraccini en esta nota publicada ayer en el sitio web
Strategic Culture Foundation:
Título:
Washington's Struggle: Remaining Relevant
Epígrafe: The
most important event of the past 70 years is the change in the international
order, from a US unipolar domination to a new multipolar reality. The
fundamental question lies in understanding how this transition is taking place,
its consequences and root causes
Texto: The
transition in the international order, from a pre-WWI multipolar world to a
post-WWII bipolar world, cost humanity a world war involving millions of
deaths. The next stage, distinct from the conflicts between the USSR and the
US, ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, but without the tragedy of
direct confrontation. This fundamental historical difference has its own
intrinsic logic governing the relationship of forces between powers. The USSR
was a country in decline, unable to continue its role on the international
stage as the premier anti-hegemonic power.
The transition from
a bipolar to a unipolar reality could have had nuclear consequences, but an
agreement between the powers avoided this danger. The upshot was an
unconditional surrender of the USSR, with catastrophic consequences in economic
and cultural terms for the superpower to come to terms with, but at least
without the explosion of a large-scale conflict.
With the end of
the bipolar model, however, began what some historians declared to be the «end
of history»: the transition from a multipolar world, to a bipolar world, to end
in a unipolar world. From the point of view of Washington, the story ended with
only one global power remaining, thereby granting the United States the power
to decide matters for the whole world.
The scenario in
which we live today, in terms of international law and the balance of forces,
is almost unprecedented in history if looked at in the present context. It is
true that the current transition from a unipolar to a multipolar reality is
something similar to what has been seen in previous decades, with the
transition from British hegemony in the late-nineteenth century to a multipolar
situation in the period preceding the two world wars. Nevertheless, resorting
to this historical analogy is difficult, given the relative absence of international
rules compared to a century ago. Therefore it is difficult to use the earlier
transition period to make assumptions about future trends.
The causes of
change
The attitude of
the US over the last 25 years has been focused completely on the achievement of
global hegemony. The dream of having control over every event, in every corner
of the world, has ironically led to accelerating the end of America’s unipolar
moment. Of course the deep meaning of the word "control" can be expanded
upon, examining the merits of the cultural, economic and military impositions
that result from a constant quest for global domination.
The US has chosen
an impassable road that is full of contradictions to justify their rise as a
global power. In two decades we have witnessed the dismantling of all the key
principles of the balance of power between Russia and the United States,
necessitating the change in international relations from unipolar to
multipolar. Similarly, the ratio of economic and military power between China
and the United States has significantly worsened, culminating in the dangerous
dispute over the South China Sea. The abandonment of the Kissinger doctrine
governing relations with Beijing, and the failure of the Clinton reset with
Moscow, have pushed two global powers, Russia and China, to forge an alliance
that allows for a world where there are more powers on the international stage
and not just Washington as the central focus of global relations.
The failure of
the foreign doctrine of the United States was a direct consequence of the
arrogance and the utopia of being able to dominate the planet, seeking to
extend indefinitely the unipolar moment and forging a worldwide system
culturally and economically based on the will of Washington, reinforced by a
power and military posture without precedent.
Consequences
Had Washington
thought more carefully about the consequences of their actions, and thereby
employed a more considered strategic vision, it would certainly have opted for
different choices. As a demonstration of this, we note Washington’s attitude in
the Middle East, the deciding ground for prospects of continued US global
hegemony.
Much of
Washington’s remaining capacity to influence global decisions is attributable
to the dollar and the trading of goods such as oil in that currency. With the
appearance of a world with more regional or global powers, it is easy to guess
that the rise of the Iranian Republic has consequences for the whole of the
Middle East region. The odds are evident that Tehran, culturally, economically
and militarily, will be the first regional power. Washington has realized this
and has decided to reach an agreement with the Islamic Republic in order to
remain relevant in the region and not to be cut off from future agreements.
Washington also seeks, in doing so, to counterbalance the situation with her
most influential regional allies, Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
It is a strategy
that in the Middle East has had a negative impact in the immediate present for
Riyadh, Doha, and in some ways even Ankara, who have all opted for an
autonomous and interventionist approach in the region without much consultation
with Washington. Nevertheless, the choice to include Iran as a dialogue partner
for the Middle East balance has allowed Washington to conserve the illusion
that in the future it will maintain an important role in regional decisions.
This is a decision that has created many problems with historic allies, but
Washington hopes, with a view to the future, to have made an appropriate
choice. This also explains why so many of the neoconservatives and liberals
(the promoters of a prolonged unipolar doctrine, the cause of so many failures
) are clearly opposed to this agreement.
Washington and
its establishment have opted for a cultural and economic confrontation with
Moscow, possibly militarily with Beijing in the South China Sea, in the process
impelling the emergence of a multipolar world in which more powers have the
ability, by joining together, to resist the will of the greater global power.
In fact, it is easier to frame the international balance in a multipolar model
that is slowly becoming bipolar.
We consider that
Russia and China (and to a lesser extent Iran) do not possess the military
capability to successfully oppose American power in a conventional conflict on
a grand scale. For this reason, it is easy to understand that shaping a
multipolar international order perhaps remains quite optimistic at this time.
It is similarly optimistic to maintain a unipolar world order that remains
anchored in the illusions of the American elite.
Reality rather
shows us a bipolar world, where the alternative pole to the US is represented
by the union and alliances (cultural, economic and military) of Beijing, Moscow
and Tehran. And their partnership has resulted in a change in the pattern of
international relations. The cause of this union is to be found in the will of
the US elites to prolong their unipolar moment. Instead of opting for an
agreement with another global power (probably China) and seal the international
stage in a realistic model with two poles, facing no real opposition,
Washington has exacerbated the differences by pushing countries like Russia,
China, Iran and India closer and closer together, forging what currently might
be termed a temporary bipolar model of world order.
The certainty is
that the future will turn fully into a multipolar model, and this obliges
Washington to struggle in every way possible to remain relevant. To date, apart
from nuclear agreements, every choice has been counterproductive and wrong.
Will Washington’s elites ever learn, or will they eventually become irrelevant?
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