La siguiente
nota, del 22 de Abril de este año, fue escrita por Alastair Crooke para el
Valdai Discussion Club. En la misma se detallan las preparaciones que realiza
la Federación Rusa para hacer frente a las crecientes provocaciones políticas,
mediáticas y militares de la NATO. Vale la pena leerla.
Título: The
Russians are preparing for a (defensive) big war, both conventional and hybrid
Subtítulo:
Prospect of an intense hybrid war, with Russia as its target. The type of
financial warfare is nothing new.
Texto: A leading
Russian thinker, adviser to the Russian President on economic issues, and
promoter of the Eurasian Economic Union, asked rhetorically in a recent article
whether there is any reason [for the Russians] to expect the lifting of sanctions.
His answer was a flat ‘no’: US sanctions were never about Crimea or even Syria,
he says. Rather, they were more about the financial crisis at the heart of the
western financial system, and its need to compensate for the depletion at its
core by raiding resources from the periphery (where Russia is situate). He
foresees the prospect of an intense hybrid war, with Russia as its target.
Well, Sergey
Glaziev is something of a hawk on the subject of Russian re-sovereigntisation,
so some may have doubts whether his worrying prognostication that America is on
an ineluctable course leading to some sort of confrontation with Russia, is
shared by its leaders. Does Russia really believe this to be a real risk? The
answer clearly is ‘yes’: It does. Glaziev’s point is that the hybrid aspect has
to be defended against, as much as the military aspect – and to this end, he
has submitted a series of proposals to Russia’s National Security Council to
lessen Russia’s vulnerability to geo-financial war.
Patrick Armstrong,
a former Canadian diplomat who served in Moscow, explains that there can be no
other rational explanation for how Russia is reconfiguring its army – other
than it takes the American threat very seriously. It is preparing for a big
war, as opposed to the ‘small’ agile forces that it has had until now, and
which were configured for fighting in such fronts as Chechnya and Georgia.
Armstrong writes: “one can tell a lot about what kind of war a country expects,
by understanding how it has put its [component forces] together: If you stop at
independent brigades (or brigade groups) that will have, in proportions,
depending on what you want to do, infantry, tank and artillery battalions as
well as ‘support’ elements, you are telling the world that you expect, and are
planning for, relatively small wars. If you go to divisions you are expecting
something larger and if you construct a corps (or army in Russian terminology)
you are telling the world that you are preparing for a big war”. He continues:
“What’s All This
Mean? How big a war do you anticipate? A smallish one, a bigger one or a really
big one? Your answer will determine the formations that you construct. An
important decision point, which reveals your answer, is whether you add-in the
other combat arms, and specialised support elements, at brigade (ie 5000 or so
troops) level, or at division (10,000 or so) level?
“If at brigade
level, you have made a decision that you expect your future wars to be rather
small and that all-arms formations of 5000-or-so soldiers is as big as you
need. If on the other hand, you decide to create divisions – formations about
three times as large – you are showing that you are expecting a larger war. If
you then start combining these divisions into corps, armies or even army
groups, you are expecting a really big, all-out war against a first-class
enemy. Something the size of World War II in fact…
“The [former]
Soviet Army was organised for a huge war: it had divisions, organised into
armies (corps in Western terminology), which were then organised into fronts
(armies in Western terminology) and further grouped into TVDs or Theatres of
Military Activity (army groups in Western terminology) – all backed up by a
conscription and reserve system, immense stocks of weapons and gigantic
pre-positioned ammunition dumps. This time, the Soviets did not intend to fight
the decisive battle an hour’s drive from Moscow. When the USSR collapsed, so
did that structure …
“For some years
the management of the Russian army did not appear to have understood that
everything had changed – that the huge Soviet forces were gone and would not
magically fill up with hundreds of thousands of conscripts to fill up the
“empty formations”. But, they didn’t know how to make them smaller, either: we
were always told in talks with the Russian General Staff that the state could
not afford to pay the officers the pensions and housing allowances they were
entitled to. And so this once mighty army decayed.
“Perhaps it was
failure in the First Chechen War that finally convinced headquarters that the
Russian army was not a temporarily shrunken ‘big war army’. We started being
told that they were re-designing their army around independent brigades. It was
clear from reading the periodic military and strategic doctrine documents that
the wars that Moscow foresaw were smaller wars, on the scale of border
infractions or a Chechen-sized war, in which the enemy would be small, agile
lightly-armed groups. For such conflicts, anything larger than independent all-arms
brigade-sized formations would be too large and complicated.
“And, gradually,
between the two Chechen wars, ‘divisions’ (which our inspections had shown to
be empty of soldiers but full of poorly-maintained equipment and under-paid
dispirited officers) disappeared and were replaced by ‘storage bases’. We
assumed these to be a way of avoiding the huge retirement bill while giving
officers something useful to do. At the same time independent brigade groups
began to appear, with the first ones in the south where trouble was expected.
This is one of the reasons why the second Chechen war was a victory for Moscow
…
“In short, by the
turn of the century, in their published doctrine, in everything they told us in
meetings, in deployments and in their formation structures, the Russians were
showing us they had no offensive designs against NATO and they expected no
attacks from NATO. The south was where they saw danger.
“The Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) showed us all this: the Russians were
obliged to give us a list of elements showing their precise location and
relationship to other structures with the number of soldiers and major weapons;
we could go there and check this out at any moment. Thanks to the Treaty we
always knew what they had, where they had it and how it was organised. Our
inspectors found no discrepancies. But the NATO member countries never ratified
the Treaty, continually adding conditions to it and, after years, Russia, which
had ratified it, gave up, and denounced it. And so we all lost (because it was
reciprocal) a transparent confidence building mechanism based on full
disclosure with the right to verify.
“All this time
the Russians told us that that NATO’s relentless expansion, ever closer, was a
danger (?????????) although they stopped short of calling it, as they did
terrorism, a threat (??????); “dangers” you watch; “threats” you must respond
to. NATO of course didn’t listen, arrogantly assuming NATO expansion was doing
Russia a favour and was an entitlement of the “exceptional nation” and its
allies.
“It is important
to keep in mind with the everlasting charges that Russia is “weaponising” this
and that, threatening everyone and everything, behaving in an “19th century
fashion”, invading, brutalising, and on and on, that its army structure and
deployments do not support the accusations. A few independent brigades, mostly
in the south, are not the way to threaten neighbours in the west. Where are the
rings of bases, the foreign fleet deployments, the exercises at the borders?
And, especially, where are the strike forces? Since the end of the USSR they
have not existed: As they have told us, so have they acted.
“They planned for
small wars, but NATO kept expanding; they argued, but NATO kept expanding; they
protested, but NATO kept expanding. They took no action for years. Well, they
have now: the 1st Guards Tank Army is being re-created. This army, or corps in
Western terminology, will likely have two or three tank divisions, plus a
motorised rifle division or two, plus enormous artillery and engineering
support, plus helicopters and all else.
“The 1st Guards
Tank Army will be stationed in the Western Military District to defend Russia
against NATO. It is very likely that it will be the first to receive the new
Armata family of AFVs and be staffed with professional soldiers and all the
very latest and best of Russia’s formidable defence industry. It will not be a
paper headquarters; it will be the real thing: commanded, manned, staffed,
integrated, exercised and ready to go … The decision to create a tank army
(armoured corps in Western terminology) is an indication that Russia really
does fear attack from the west, and is preparing to defend itself against it.
In short, Russia has finally come to the conclusion that NATO’s aggression
means it has to prepare for a big war.”
Of course,
Glaziev’s point was not so much about preparing for a big, classic, military
war (he is an economist), but more about the dangers from hybrid war,
precipitated by depletion at the core of Pax Americana, which is much less
visible to the public, less understood, yet deeply insidious. Glaziev would no
doubt point to the (US-Saudi orchestrated) dramatic drop in the price of oil in
1985/6, and its impact on the Soviet leadership, as an early example of
effective hybrid warfare, practiced against Russia: an army, particularly a big
army, can be of little assistance at times of financial implosion – rather the
reverse. The point here is that the re-configuration of Russia’s armed forces
underlines that Glaziev’s point that Russia is threatened by American
escalation primarily in the hybrid mode is reflected amongst the Russian
leadership. They would not be spending this money on re-shaping the armed
forces if they did not think the threat to be serious.
The type of
financial warfare (geo-financial) to which Glaziev refers, is nothing new.
Professor Carroll Quigley was formerly at Harvard, Princeton, and the school of
Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He was also something of an
‘insider’, being a friend of Rockefeller, and an important influence on his
one-time student, Bill Clinton (who was to become came an important patron of
the financial establishment, and its wider ambitions). Quigley wrote in detail
in his epic 1964book, Tragedy and Hope: A history of the world in our time
(page 324), how the men –“the Anglo-American establishment” – who constructed
our early monetary system:
“had a
far-reaching aim, nothing less than to create a world system of financial control
… able to dominate the political system of each country and the economy of the
world as a whole. This system was to be controlled … by the central banks of
the world, acting in secret agreements … Each central bank, in the hands of men
like Montagu Norman of the Bank of England (and) Benjamin Strong of the New
York Federal Reserve … sought to dominate its government by its ability to
control Treasury loans, to manipulate foreign exchanges, to influence the level
of economic activity in the country, and to influence cooperative politicians
by subsequent economic rewards in the business world. In each country the power
of the central bank rested largely on its control of credit and money supply.”
Quigley relates
that it was, for this purpose that the Federal Reserve System was established.
However, the project started rockily: the then US President William Taft
declined to support the banking élite’s scheme to create a central bank in the
United States. Taft was duly toppled – the 1907 ‘financial crisis’ being
‘crafted’ to usher in a more favourable climate towards the establishment of an
American central bank, and a more compliant President Wilson, shortly after
taking office, signed the Federal Reserve Act.
But as Quigley
noted: “It must not be felt that the heads of the world’s chief central banks
were themselves substantive powers in world finance. They were not. Rather they
were the technicians and agents of the dominant investment bankers of their own
countries, who had raised them up, and who were perfectly capable of throwing
them down. The substantive financial powers of the world were in the hands of
these investment bankers who remained largely behind the scenes in their own
unincorporated private banks. These formed a system of international cooperation
and national dominance which was more private, more powerful, and more secret
than that of their agents in the central banks.”
What is so
intriguing about Quigley’s writings was his awareness, proximity and
understanding of the workings of the unofficial levers of western power, and
more specifically a group which evolved from what he referred to as the ‘Anglo
American Establishment’ in an earlier manuscript, and which we have come now to
call the American ‘deep state’ (in its wider manifestation). Quigley wrote, “I
know of the operations of this network because I have studied it for twenty
years, and was permitted for two years, in the early 1960s, to examine its
papers and secret records. I have no aversion to it or most of its aims and have,
for much of my life, been close to it and to many of its instruments.”
Plus ça change,
plus c’est la meme chose! The names may have changed – Goldman Sachs vice
Rockefeller – but otherwise, the ‘system’ is still intact (just). What did
change however, was the exceptionalism demanded by the US in the wake of the
9/11 World Trade Centre attacks. This effectively turbocharged the tools of
geo-financial warfare. In pursuit of the eradication of ‘terrorism’, money
laundering, and of the global implementation of US enacted sanctions on ‘bad
actors’, America has increased its claim to legal jurisdiction to extend to
virtually the entire global financial system. The imposition of secondary
sanctions affecting third countries, the levying of quite arbitrary and massive
fines on banks, the threat of expulsion from the global financial system,
derivative based ‘runs’ on currencies (i.e. the (orchestrated) run on the
rouble on 15 & 16 December 2014); plays with dollar appreciation and
devaluation impacting on dollar-denominated debt held outside of the United
States — in aggregate, all these measures combined had truly become more potent
than conventional weaponry; more powerful, in some cases, than an army.
If proof were
needed, we have only to look at the domination of EU domestic and foreign
policy that has been obtained by Washington through the US Treasury’s ability
to strike sheer terror in the hearts of European banks, to cow governments
(Germany), and, in co-ordination with the ECB, oust European leaders (Berlusconi)
and to break populist governments (Greece).
As the eminent
economist, Professor Michael Hudson has noted in respect to this financial
subjugation of European states:
“[T]here is no
legal framework for writing down debts owed to the IMF, the European Central
Bank (ECB), or to European and American creditor governments. Since the 1960s,
entire nations have been subjected to austerity and economic shrinkage that
makes it less and less possible to extricate themselves from debt. Governments
are unforgiving, and the IMF and ECB act on behalf of banks and bondholders –
and are ideologically captured by anti-labor, anti-government, financial
warriors.”
“The result is
not the “free market economy” it pretends to be, nor is it the rule of
economically rational law. A genuine market economy would recognize financial
reality and write down debts in keeping with their ability to be paid. But
inter-government debt overrides markets and refuses to acknowledge the need for
a Clean Slate. Today’s guiding theory – backed by monetarist junk economics –
is that debts of any size can be paid, simply by reducing labor’s wages and
living standards, plus by selling off a nation’s public domain – its land, oil
and gas reserves, minerals and water distribution, roads and transport systems,
power plants and sewage systems, and public infrastructure of all forms.”
“…The immediate
political aim of this financial warfare in Greece is to replace its elected
government (supported by a remarkable July 5 referendum vote of 61 to 39) with
foreign creditor control by “technocrats,” that is, bank lobbyists, factotums
and former Goldman Sachs managers. The long-term aim is to impose a war against
labor – in the form of austerity – and against the power of governments to determine
their own tax policy, financial policy and public regulatory policy” [emphasis
added].
No wonder, at a
moment when the very hallmark of impending hybrid warfare is manifest in a new
round of demonization of President Putin arising from the ‘Panama Papers’
(although he is not named in them), the question is raised: “whether there is
any reason to expect a lifting of European sanctions on Russia”. Ostensibly,
the answer should be ‘no’. Just look at how the US Treasury effectively is
voiding the lifting of sanctions on Iran by strong-arming the European banks to
stay aloof from the financing of Iranian trade or infrastructure – in spite of
Iran’s acknowledged compliance with the JCPOA. President Obama merely responded
to Iranian complaints on this score — that the benefits (of the lifting of
sanctions) would only accrue when Iran has more fully integrated into the US
managed global economy, changed its complexion, and become more ‘business
friendly’ (i.e. only when Iran has fully acquiesced to US financial hegemony).
But … But, on the
other hand, President Obama does want ‘industrial quiet’ in Syria (and in the
rest of the Middle East) for the duration of the Presidential campaign season,
and Angela Merkel’s political domination of this issue (sanctions on Russia)
within the EU is slipping as a result of the widespread hostility to her stance
on the refugee issue. European politics are quite conflicted, but it is clear
that the rebellion against prolonging Russia sanctions has growing traction.
In one sense,
these latter objections are symbolic of the under-the-table debate that is
extant in Europe, focussed on how America’s judicial overreach on Europe’s
banking sector is adversely impinging on Europe’s own foreign interests (recall
that the Euro was originally conceived as the means to escape from under the
‘hammer’ of Greenspan). And – as importantly – how Europe’s new ‘Economic
Government’ of the ECB plus Bundesbank, controlled by a handful of ‘northern’
European players (many of them Goldman Sachs alumni), are crushing southern
Europe, to the point of provoking popular revolt. The ‘deep state’ (we should
no longer perhaps call it Anglo-American, as it has become more cosmopolitan
than that) in short, simply is intent on crushing any flickers of nationalism
or sovereignty in southern Europe in order to force the introduction of
European and global financial governance – as the EU official formerly heading
the EU unit responsible for the European Monetary System and European monetary
policy has explained.
And the other big
‘But …’ is that it is now the case that it is not just banks which are ‘too big
to fail’ – it is the market itself which has become too influential, and too
big, to fail. ‘It’ must be propped up (by whatever means necessary), in order
to maintain the illusion of ‘growth’ and rising wealth to an ever more
sceptical audience (both lay and expert). In short, the imperative to maintain
market stability in New York is trumping the use of the system as a financial
weapon by which simply to extend its foreign reach, and to prevent any
competitor, such as China, from emerging. The bubble excesses are shifting the
historic calculus.
But (as the
financial blogger Charles Hugh Smith has noted) boosting ‘the market
psychology’ requires ever greater extremes: extremes of debt, use of more
esoteric trading instruments, greater leverage, and higher valuations. These
extremes, per se, destabilise markets, “first beneath the surface and then all
too visibly”. And the advent of new technologies (particularly those of High
Frequency Trading and the widespread use of robots to conduct trading) posses
an inherent potential to destabilise markets globally. In short, the American
and European economic and political structure is now almost wholly dependent on
continued, and ever ‘accommodating’, central bank stimulus for ‘the market’ and
in avoiding any de-stabilising market lurch. And China, just recently, has
demonstrated that it too, can, if it so chooses, oscillate the exchange rate of
the Yuan and precisely ‘lurch’ ‘the market’ (see here), causing the Federal
Reserve to rush to back-down on a stronger dollar (which threatened China with
an outflow of capital).
The paradox here
is that the faltering financial and credit bubble and its present vulnerability
to shocks of whatever nature at the tail end of a long credit cycle, is making
the US Treasury and Fed risk adverse (as evidenced by the US Treasury Secretary
Jacob Lew’s call for more sensitivity in using the Treasury’s ‘neutron bombs’).
What Lew left unsaid was that the new ‘sensitivity’ was not some new-found
American ‘statesmanship’, but rather, the raw fact that the Fed and the
Treasury cannot risk the bubble deflating for fear of it collapsing into a
major asset deflation. This is the strength into which China so successfully
played.
This is the ‘eye
of the needle’, too, through which Russia must pass if it is to obtain a
lifting of EU sanctions. ‘The market’ is vulnerable to any kind of disturbance,
and the US President is vulnerable to external distractions during the
Presidential election process. Can Russian co-operation in Syria – especially
at the sensitive moment when the cessation of hostilities isdisintegrating–
provide the circumstances for a ‘grand bargain’ and a lifting of sanctions? The
needle’s ‘eye’ is, indeed, narrow, given the strength of the historic dynamics
stemming from what Quigley called the Anglo-American Establishment and from
NATO.
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