Poco sabemos de
lo que pasa realmente en Corea del Norte, la tierra del Alegre Camarada Kim (foto). La
cosa es que este es un país clave para la integración económica de sus vecinos,
los gigantes China, Japón y Corea del Sur. La nota que sigue es de Pepe Escobar
para Asia Times y salió ayer:
Título: North Korea: The
Really Serious Options on the Table
Texto: The
National People’s Congress in Beijing made it clear that China in the 21st
century as led by Xi Jinping now relies, as a state, on the “core” leader’s “four comprehensives” as the
letter of the law.
The “four
comprehensives” are to build a moderately prosperous society; deepen economic
reform; advance the law-based governance of China; and strengthen the Communist
Party’s self-governance.
No foreign-policy
adventure/disaster should be allowed to interfere with the “four
comprehensives,” which, extrapolated, are also linked to the imperative success
of the New Silk Roads (One Belt, One Road), China’s ambitious outreach across
Eurasia.
But then there’s
supremely unpredictable North Korea. And the notorious Lenin line resurfaces:
“What is to be done?”
Pyongyang has
successfully tested land-based, mobile, solid-fueled intermediate-range
ballistic missiles. When operational, this development translates into a North
Korean first-strike capability difficult to track, as well as the means to
absorb an initial foreign attack and retaliate with – nuclear-tipped? –
missiles.
Four North Korean
missiles recently – and deliberately – aimed at the Sea of Japan constitute a
clear message: We are able to hit US military forces in Japan and we can defeat
any missile defense deployed or to be deployed by the US, Japan and South
Korea.
Patience or bust
US Secretary of
State “T Rex” Tillerson has officially proclaimed that the era of US “strategic
patience” concerning North Korea is over, and “all options are on the table.”
Yet this does not necessarily mean a new war in the Korean Peninsula led by
President Donald Trump, which would be an absolute folly with horrific
consequences, and all for nothing. Pyongyang carefully protects its crack team
of engineers, who would put a nuclear program back on track in no time.
Team Trump knows
very well that Seoul – extremely vulnerable to the North’s military machine –
would veto military strikes against North Korea, as would Beijing.
It’s significant
that Chinese media have chosen to emphasize Tillerson’s “moderate” tone on
North Korea – while duly signaling the failure, once again, of trademark US
sanctions policy.
Every major world
actor knows that the abandonment of “strategic patience” plus a deluge of
additional sanctions will inevitably lead to Pyongyang, in a flash, selling
fissile material in the global black market for ready cash.
And overwhelming pressure
on North Korea may lead to the lethal counterpunch of that country accumulating
up to 50 nuclear weapons capable of hitting anywhere in South Korea and Japan
by 2022.
So the only
reasonable option is what for Washington, so far, has been anathema: to sit
down at the negotiating table with Pyongyang and hammer out a definitive peace
treaty to replace the current armistice that suspended, but did not officially
end, the Korean War. That is what I heard over and over again when I visited
North Korea for Asia Times.
And it should be
crystal clear: peace treaty first; then the end of sanctions; then North Korea
ending its nuclear-weapons program. That also happens to be what the Chinese
government wants; Beijing is terrified of a war sooner or later disturbing the
currently frozen – albeit dissolving – status quo.
The problem is
that Team Trump – just like the previous US administration of Barack Obama –
assumes that Pyongyang, under pressure, must relinquish its nuclear-weapons
program before the negotiations start. Wishful thinking, as anyone who has been
to North Korea knows. North Korea is for all practical purposes a nuclear
power. The only way it might get on the road to becoming a “normal” nuclear
power, like for instance Pakistan, is for the Korean War to be finally over.
The ‘invisible’
Tokyo-Beijing gamble
But then there’s
a fascinating parallel development, as relayed by European Union diplomats
directly dealing with Asia. Japanese industrialists mostly don’t buy Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe’s conservative old-guard xenophobia concerning China.
Japanese exports to China are actually rising compared with Japanese exports to
the US.
Former minister
Ichiro Ozawa, aka “Shadow Shogun,” president of the Liberal Party and former
leader of several opposition parties, is plotting to unseat Abe in the next
general election. He is calling for the merger of his Liberal Party, the
Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Party, saying, quite rightly, “We
can’t win if we fight separately,” adding that the three parties “can unite on
basic policies” as they all call for shutting down nuclear plants, scrapping
the new national-security laws and rejecting the next increase in the
consumption tax.
As important, the
LP, DPJ and SDP strongly favor Tokyo-Beijing rapprochement, and Ozawa’s
pedigree as a “friend of China” is well established.
In December 2009,
when he was secretary general of the ruling DPJ, Ozawa famously led a group of
600 Democratic parliamentarians and businessmen to China. At the beginning of
his political career as a Liberal Democratic Party member of parliament, Ozawa
was the closest political ally of prime minister Kakuei Tanaka, who is most
remembered for normalizing Japanese relations with the People’s Republic of
China in 1972. It is from “Kaku-san” that Ozawa inherited the title of “Shadow
Shogun,” and it is to this day that Ozawa believes that his mentor was
scapegoated for the Lockheed scandal and driven out of office because he saw
close China-Japan relations as as key to East Asian peace and prosperity.
Meanwhile in
South Korea, after the debacle over the impeachment of conservative president
Park Geun-hye, there are considerable forces warming up to Beijing. A political
majority in South Korea favors economic cooperation with China – for instance,
in the aeronautics industry – coupled with an Asian entente to solve the North
Korea problem.
The most probable
winner of the next presidential election to be held on May 9 is Moon Jae-in, a
firm supporter of the Sunshine Policy of closer contacts and economic
cooperation with Pyongyang and no revival of the military pressure inaugurated
by former president Kim Dae-jung and pursued by Seoul from 1998 to 2008.
Facts on the
geopolitical ground spell out massive unpopularity of the THAAD (Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense) missile system possibly to be deployed by the end of
next month in South Korea.
When Tillerson
urged Beijing to refrain from creating economic policies that could hinder the
deployment of THAAD, that could have been coded language acknowledging that
Beijing has moved heavy electronic-warfare jammers up to positions where THAAD
may be rendered useless against a possible North Korean response.
And that ties in
perfectly with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently describing Beijing and
Pyongyang as being as close as “lips and teeth” – though, of course, teeth can
sometimes bloody lips, and China has also called on North Korea to suspend
nuclear and missile activities in exchange for a halt in US and South Korean
military exercises. “The two sides are like two accelerating trains coming
towards each other,” Wang said on the sidelines of the recently concluded
National People’s Congress in Beijing, defining it as China’s task to “apply
brakes on both trains”.
Doing it the Asian way
Beijing could
possibly deliver calibrated economic pressure on North Korea (suspension of
coal imports) and at the same time imprint on Washington the necessity of
dialogue, eventually bringing both parties to the table.
At the Obama-Xi
Sunnylands summit in 2013, Xi stressed a “new type of relations between major
powers,” based on “non-conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect and win-win
cooperation”. It hasn’t happened – yet.
But absent a
torrent of off-message late-night tweets, the Trump-Xi summit at Mar-a-Lago,
Florida, next month might well deliver a compromise.
Meanwhile, the
Tokyo-Beijing track, invisible to the Trump-Xi track, could be laid with Abe
out of power.
The first major
consequence of a Tokyo-Beijing rapprochement might be a negotiated solution for
North Korea that would include a “soft” end of the Kim dynasty.
However it
happens, South Korea would likely refuse a lightning-quick reunification,
German-style. North Korea would remain as the same state for at least another
decade, with Chinese cadres, including influential members/associates of the
Politburo, helping remaining technocrats in the North to step beyond the Kim
dynasty.
Under this
optimistic scenario, after one century of hardcore conflict, Japan and China
might aim for some sort of reconciliation – call it a historical compromise –
very much aligned to Xi Jinping’s ideas, now that he’s finalizing being
completely in charge of the People’s Liberation Army and totally in control of
the Communist Party machine.
A mix of Japan’s
high technology and China’s industrial solidity would mean a quick overtaking
of the US, an economic-policy convergence beyond the short-term profitability
of financial speculation, stressing economic balance, with the priority being
job preservation and solidarity-based social policies.
Talk about a
major intellectual advance of the East over the West. But first, gotta talk to
Pyongyang.
muy bueno su post compañero. Sincermente le digo que mayoritariamente recurro al Google-traslate, pero el mismo anda bastante bien y los articulos se interpretan. Saludos
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