Pactos

Finalmente Donald Trump se expidió sobre el pacto nuclear firmado a fines de la administración Obama. No lo valida, pero no lo rompe. En fin, esto parece la independencia catalana. La nota que sigue es de Jan Martínez Ahrens para el diario español El País:


Título: Trump se aleja del acuerdo con Irán: “Voy a cerrar un camino que lleva al terror, la violencia y la bomba nuclear”

Subtítulo: El presidente anuncia que no validará el pacto, pero no lo rompe. Su objetivo es ampliar su perímetro punitivo y que se sancione también el programa balístico

Texto: El presidente de Estados Unidos ha dado este viernes una sacudida al tablero internacional. Cada vez más alejado de sus aliados europeos, Donald Trump ha anunciado que no certificará el pacto nuclear con Irán y que deja que sea el Congreso quien decida su futuro, siempre que imponga nuevas limitaciones. La medida, aunque no supone la prometida ruptura del acuerdo, abre una estrategia mucho más agresiva con Teherán y un capítulo incierto para Oriente Próximo. "Cuando más tiempo se ignora una amenaza, mayor se vuelve. Voy a cerrar un camino que lleva al terror, la violencia y el arma nuclear. En cualquier momento puedo acabar con el pacto", afirmó Trump.

El presidente elevó el tono. Frente a la discreción de sus asesores, volcados en minimizar el incendio, Trump trazó un aguafuerte de un “régimen fanático, dictatorial y terrorista”. Un semillero mundial de “destrucción y muerte” que tiene que ser frenado. “Irán nunca tendrá la bomba atómica. Las agresiones no han dejado de incrementarse y es hora de ponerles fin”, zanjó el presidente.

Su rotundidad, que generó un inmediato rechazo de Irán, vino acompañada con el anuncio de nuevas sanciones económicas a la Guardia Revolucionaria y la decisión de no validar el acuerdo. Un paso que, sin reactivar los latigazos económicos al programa nuclear iraní, sí que persigue ampliar la diana contra el régimen de los ayatolás.

El objetivo declarado es que el Congreso añada líneas rojas a Teherán y que, en caso de incumplimiento, se reanuden los castigos. En este nuevo umbral punitivo entrarían el programa balístico, la posibilidad de tener una bomba atómica en menos de un año y la negativa a extender la duración de las restricciones a la producción de combustible nuclear. “Buscamos neutralizar la capacidad de desestabilización del Gobierno de Irán y aminorar su apoyo al terrorismo”, señala un documento de la Casa Blanca.

El giro presagia tormenta. Con Trump han irrumpido en la Casa Blanca los tambores del miedo. Los complejos equilibrios fraguados durante el mandato de Barack Obama han empezado a saltar. No se trata solo de la retirada del acuerdo contra el cambio climático o la frenética escalada nuclear con Corea del Norte. También son las relaciones con Cuba, reducidas a su mínima expresión, y ahora el pacto nuclear con Irán.

En su día, el acuerdo fue saludado como un hito del multilateralismo y el diálogo. Un logro de la diplomacia de Obama equiparable a los acuerdos de Camp David. El texto, sellado en 2015 en Viena, limitaba el programa atómico iraní a cambio del levantamiento de sanciones económicas. Pero su alcance era mucho mayor. Dos enemigos acérrimos, que se habían enfrentado durante 40 años, se daban la mano y decidían concederse un respiro. En una tierra negra de sangre y fuego, el acercamiento de ambos contendientes parecía abrir una puerta a la calma. El acuerdo venía además refrendado por otras cinco potencias (Francia, Rusia, China, Reino Unido y Alemania), con lo que se volvía un modelo para resolver conflictos.

El éxito fue grande, aunque no absoluto. Desde el inicio Israel lo rechazó. No se fiaba de los buenos propósitos de Irán y sostenía que contiene una cláusula de extinción que se activa pasado el decenio y que, por tanto, no pone fin real al desarrollo del arma nuclear.

Por su parte, así comentaba la reacción iraní el medio PressTV, de ese mismo país:


Título: US president’s anti-Iran speech pile of delusional claims: Rouhani

Epígrafe: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani says US President Donald Trump’s speech against the Islamic Republic was nothing more than insults and delirious talk.

Texto: “Mr. Trump’s remarks on Iran…contained nothing but expletives and a pile of delusional allegations against the Iranian nation,” Rouhani said in a televised speech on Friday moments after Trump delivered a speech outlining US strategy on the Islamic Republic.

The US president refused to certify the 2015 international nuclear agreement between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany and warned he might ultimately terminate it, in defiance of other world powers and undermining a landmark victory of multilateral diplomacy.

Trump said he would choose not to certify that Tehran is complying with the nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Trump also said his goal is to ensure Iran would never obtain a nuclear weapon, adding, "We will not continue down a path whose predictable conclusion is more violence, more terror and the very real threat of Iran’s nuclear breakout."

While Trump did not pull Washington out of the nuclear deal, he gave the US Congress 60 days to decide whether to reimpose economic sanctions against Tehran that were lifted under the pact. Reimposing sanctions would put the US at odds with other signatories of the accord such as the UK, France, China, Russia and Germany, as well as the European Union.

Censuring Trump for calling the Persian Gulf the "Arabian Gulf," Rouhani urged the US president to brush up on his world history and geography to improve his comprehension of international obligations and global ethics, etiquette and conventions.

“How [is it possible] that a president has not yet learned the name of the world-renowned and historical Persian Gulf… where unfortunately US warships unnecessarily and repeatedly sail through? He could have at least asked his [country’s] military officials how the name of this gulf is printed on the maps they use,” Rouhani stated.

He further pointed to the history of US antagonism toward Iran, saying, "He has to study history better and more closely and know what they (US officials) have done to the Iranian people over the past sixty-something years and how they have treated the people of Iran during the past 40 years after the victory of the [Islamic] Revolution [in 1979]."

The Iranian president further rejected Trump's demand that the JCPOA be revised, saying the agreement would remain intact and no article or paragraph would be added or taken away from it. 

He added that one president alone cannot abrogate an international deal, saying, “He [Trump] apparently does not know that this is not a bilateral document between Iran and the US for him to act in any way he wishes.”

Rouhani said Iran will only respect its nuclear deal commitments so long as its rights are safeguarded, adding, “Iran will honor its commitments as long as its interests are served.”

He also emphasized that the Islamic Republic has cooperated and would continue its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency as long as the country’s interests are protected and its rights are preserved.

“However, if one day our interests are not served, we will not hesitate even one moment and will respond,” the Iranian president said.

“The Iranian nation has not yielded to any power and will not do so in the future,” Rouhani said, emphasizing that many countries supported former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein during the imposed war against Iran in the 1980s but they failed to defeat the Iranians.

Rouhani further pointed to Trump's announcement of sanctions against Iran's Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), saying, "The IRGC is a powerful force and the people are always standing by the IRGC."

"Is it the IRGC that is corrupt or governments and armed forces who have always intervened in this region against the independence of nations?"  

Trump also announced sanctions on the IRGC, which he accused of destabilizing the Middle East and threatening American interests in the region.

“I am authorizing the Treasury Department to further sanction the entire Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps for its support for terrorism and to apply sanctions to its officials, agents and affiliates," he claimed.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry said in a statement earlier Friday that the Iranian Armed Forces, including the IRGC, are the symbol of power and defenders of security and are supported by the Iranian government and nation.

The statement, which came a few hours before Trump’s speech, emphasized that Iran’s core policy is to support regional peace and stability and confront any destabilizing and divisive measures aimed at creating tensions and conflicts in the region.

Rouhani further questioned the US motives in expressing concern over Iran's missile program, saying the US is providing arms to "aggressive countries" to target innocent people in the region, including in Yemen.

"Our missiles are for our defense and we have always endeavored for the production of our weapons and we will redouble our efforts from now on and will continue enhancing our defensive [prowess]."

Sigue Flandes

El sainete catalán continúa, pero no crean que son todas risas y aplausos en el circo europeo. Hay fuerzas que comienzan a desatarse, cada vez más visibles, cada vez más abiertas. Un caso notorio es el de Flandes, región separatista del norte de Bélgica. La nota que sigue es de Andrew Korybko para el sitio web Oriental Review:


Título: Forget Catalonia, Flanders Is The Real Test Case Of EU Separatism!

Texto: Catalonia’s separatist campaign has dominated European headlines for the past couple of weeks, but it’s really the northern Belgian region of Flanders which will serve as a barometer over whether large chunks of the EU will fall apart into a collection of identity-centric statelets prior to the bloc’s reconstitution into a “federation of regions”.

What’s going on in Catalonia is of paramount importance to the geopolitical future of Europe, since it could very well serve as the catalyst for fracturing the EU if copycat movements elsewhere are emboldened by the Spanish region’s possible separatist success. This was explained in detail in the author’s recent analysis about “The Catalan Chain Reaction”, which readers should familiarize themselves with if they’re not already acquainted with the thesis put forth in that work. To concisely summarize, there’s a very distinct possibility that the EU’s liberal-globalist elite have been planning to divide and rule the continent along identity-based lines in order to further their ultimate goal of creating a “federation of regions”.

Catalonia is the spark that could set off this entire process, but it could also just be a flash in the pan that might end up being contained no matter what its final result may be. Flanders, however, is much different because of the heightened symbolism that Belgium holds in terms of EU identity, and the dissolution of this somewhat artificially created state would be the clearest sign yet that the EU’s ruling elite intend to take the bloc down the direction of manufactured fragmentation. Bearing this in mind, the spread of the “Catalan Chain Reaction” to Belgium and the inspiration that this could give to Flanders to break off from the rest of the country should be seen as the true barometer over whether or not the EU’s “nation-states” will disintegrate into a constellation of “Balkanized” ones.


“The First Bosnia”

In order to properly understand the state of affairs at play, it’s necessary to briefly review the history of what could in some sense be described as “The First Bosnia”, or in other words, Europe’s “first artificially created state”. Most of the territory of what is nowadays referred to as Belgium was unified with the modern-day Netherlands from 1482-1581 when the political entity was referred to as the Habsburg Netherlands. The southern part (Belgium) came under Spanish control from 1581-1714 when it was called the Spanish Netherlands. Afterwards, it passed under Austrian administration from 1714-1797 when it became the Austrian Netherlands prior to its brief incorporation into the First French Republic and later Empire from 1797-1815. It was during the Spanish and Austrian eras that Belgium began to consider Catholicism as an inseparable part of its national identity in opposition to the Netherland’s Protestantism. Finally, Belgium was part of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands from 1815-1839 until the Belgian Revolutionmade it an independent state for the first time in its history.

In essence, what ended up happening is that a majority-Catholic but ethno-linguistically divided population got caught up in the 19th century’s wave of nationalism and created a hybrid Franco-Dutch state that would eventually federalize in the late-20th century, in a structural sense serving as a precursor to the dysfunctional Balkan creation of Bosnia almost a century and a half later.

It’s important to mention that the territory of what would eventually become Belgium had regularly been a battleground between the competing European powers of the Netherlands, the pre-unification German states, France, the UK, and even Spain and Austria during their control of this region, and this new country’s creation was widely considered by some to be nothing more than a buffer state. The 1830 London Conference between the UK, France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia saw the Great Power of the time recognize the fledgling entity as an independent actor, with Paris even militarily intervening to protecting it during Amsterdam’s failed “Ten Day’s Campaign” to reclaim its lost southern province in summer 1831. For as artificial of a political construction as Belgium was, it fared comparatively well during the 19th century as it leveraged its copious coal supplies and geostrategic position to rapidly industrialize and eventually become a genocidal African colonizer in the Congo. Although it was devastated in both World Wars, Belgium was able to bounce back in a relatively short period of time, partly because it could rely on its Congolese prison state.


In The Belly Of The Beast

Flash forward to the present, and the only thing that modern-day Belgium has in common with its past self is its internal divisions. The post-colonial aftermath of “losing the Congo” and shortly beforehand agreeing to host the capital of the European Union opened up previously nationalistic Belgium to liberal-globalist influence, which contributed to what would eventually become its utter domestic dysfunction in recent years. It wasn’t by chance that Brussels was chosen as the EU’s headquarters either, since its inherent weakness was thought to make it an ideal “compromise country” for establishing the bloc’s headquarters, as it would never become as powerful as France, for example, in potentially monopolizing the international organization’s agenda. Again, Belgium’s history as a buffer state/region came into relevant play in positioning it “in the belly of the beast” that’s nowadays reviled by all sorts of individuals across the continent.

The administrative disconnect between its northern region of Flanders and the southern one of Wallonia, as well as what would eventually become its multi-tiered federal, regional, and community structure, was exploited by the EU’s ideologically extreme elite to make the country the centerpiece of their “multiculturalexperiment”. After decades of facilitating mass migration from civilizationally dissimilar societies of the “Global South”, 5.9% of the country is Muslim while at least an astonishing 20% of Brussels follows Islam. Almost all of the capital’s Muslims are immigrants, mostly from Morocco and Turkey, which isn’t surprising considering that 70% of Brussels’ inhabitants are foreign-born. Unfortunately for the native locals, the “multicultural experiment” has failed miserably, and Belgium is now Europe’s jihadist leader in terms of the per capita number of fighters who have travelled abroad to join Daesh.  All things considered, the “utopia” that the Belgians were promised by joining the EU and hosting its headquarters has turned into a dystopia, and the country now finds itself in the belly of the liberal-globalist beast.

It’s little wonder than that some of Belgium’s population wants to escape from the organization which is responsible for their socio-cultural and security challenges, ergo the Flemish independence movement which aims to see the country’s northern region become an independent state because of the lopsided demographic-economic advantage that it has over Wallonia. Flanders contributes four times as much to Belgium’s national economy as Catalonia does to Spain’s, being responsible for a whopping 80% of the country’s GDP as estimated by the European Commission, and it also accounts for roughly two-thirds of Belgium’s total population unlike Catalonia’s one-sixth or so. This means that Flemish independence would be absolutely disastrous for the people living in the remaining 55% of the “Belgian” rump state, which would for all intents and purposes constitute a de-facto, though unwillingly, independent Wallonia. Therefore, it’s important to forecast what could happen if Belgium ultimately implodes with Flanders’ possible secession.


Breaking The Buffer State

This section should appropriately be prefaced by emphasizing that there’s no guarantee that Flanders will actually secede from Belgium, or that it would be successful in holding an unconstitutional referendum such as the one that Catalonia did in attempting to “legitimize” its anti-state ambitions. Furthermore, the Belgian state or its EU superstate overseer might resort to force just as Madrid did in trying to prevent this region’s secession, so the reader shouldn’t take it for granted that Flanders will inevitably become an independent state. Having gotten the “disclaimer” out of the way, however, there’s a very real chance that the “Catalan Chain Reaction” will spread to the “belly of the beast” in catalyzing a similar separatist process in Flanders, hence why the author argued in the introduction that the outcome of such a reenergized post-Catalan movement in this region will be the best barometer in gauging whether the EU’s liberal-globalist elite do indeed plan to “Balkanize” the bloc into an array of regionally “federalized” identity-centric statelets.

Given the domestic and historical particularities of the Belgian case study, it appears likely that Flanders’ successful secession (however it ends up coming about) would lead to a narrow range of geopolitical outcomes for the Western European country. The first one is that Wallonia would be unable to function as a stand-alone “rump”/”independent” state given its measly 20% of unified Belgium’s GDP, its one-third of the previous population, and presumed dependency on Flanders’ port of Antwerp for most economic contact with the “outside world’ aside from France and Germany. For these reasons, it’s conceivable that the French-speaking region could be taken over by France just like how the famous French diplomat Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord originally envisioned in his unfulfilled eponymous “Talleyrand partition plan” that was first unveiled during the 1830 London Conference. As for Flanders itself, it could either attempt to remain an “independent” state or possibly confederate with the Netherlands, if there was any desire from both parties for this latter option.

Where things get tricky, however, is when it comes to the German-speaking community in eastern Wallonia, which might not want to become part of France. Also, for reasons of sensitive political-historical optics, they probably wouldn’t be able to join Germany because it would carry uncomfortably strong shadows of Hitler’s annexation of the Sudetenland during the pre-World World II dissolution of Czechoslovakia. Therefore, it’s likely that this sub-region would remain within Wallonia, which itself would probably become part of France, albeit with possible autonomy guaranteed to the German speakers that Paris would be “inheriting”. That said, this isn’t the trickiest part of any Belgian breakup, as the status of Brussels would definitely occupy center stage in this scenario. The EU would be inclined to see to it that its capital becomes an “independent” city-state on par with similarly sized Liechtenstein, though with a much higher and more dangerous Salafist demographic to contend with, one which could make it the “rightful” capital of “Eurabia” if civilizational-geopolitical trends continue in that direction.


Concluding Thoughts

The future of Flanders will be more of a harbinger of the EU’s administrative-political future than Catalonia’s will be, though the latter is indeed the trigger for sparking what might become the former’s emboldened separatist push. If the host country of the EU’s headquarters falls victim to the secessionist trend that might be poised to sweep across the bloc due to the “Catalan Chain Reaction”, then it would confidently indicate that the EU’s ruling liberal-globalist elite are determined to initiate the “controlled Balkanization” of the continent into a constellation of identity-centric statelets so as to ultimately satisfy their long-held goal of implementing a “federation of regions. There is no place in Europe more symbolically significant than Belgium, and especially its jihadist dystopian capitalof Brussels, so if the European power structures “allow” Flanders to separate from “the First Bosnia”, then it’s all but certain that the rest of the bloc will feel the geopolitical reverberations within their own borders sooner than later.

Mientras tanto, en Turquía...

¿Hacia dónde va Turquía? Parece estar amagando todo el tiempo de acuerdo con el humor de su principal dirigente, el presidente Tayyip Erdogan. Sin embargo, tal como lo hemos anticipado en notas anteriores, algunos ven un proceso paulatino de cambio en las relaciones estratégicas de ese país. La nota que sigue es de Dmitri Minin para el sitio web Strategic Culture Foundation: 


Título: The underlying reasons for Turkey’s disengagement from the US and the West

Texto: The Turkish media is reporting that a staffer at the American consulate general in Istanbul was recently arrested under the serious charge of attempting the “destruction of the constitutional order,” “espionage,” and seeking “to overthrow the government.”

To be specific, ties have been uncovered between the man under arrest and some prominent members of Fethullah Gülen’s movement (FETÖ), which is banned in Turkey. Previous accusations had been made against General Joseph Votel, the commander of US CENTCOM and an expert in covert operations, alleging that he had cooperated with the conspirators who attempted a military coup in Turkey in July 2016.

And this is only the tip of a very cold and growing iceberg that has gradually been disrupting the relationship between these formerly close allies - the US and Turkey. Not even President Erdogan’s visit to the US this year could buck these trends.

Observing that relations between the two countries have been deteriorating for more than a decade, US columnists, for example - Tom Rogan of the Washington Examiner - reflexively sum it all up as evidence of the deleterious influence of Vladimir Putin. In his assessment of the most recent meeting between the Russian and Turkish presidents in Ankara, that journalist points to the fact that Recep Erdogan called Vladimir Putin “my dear friend” and even “stroked his ego” by speaking to him - horror of horrors! - “in Russian,” as though that were a crime.

CNBC also notes that Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin “share a general suspicion and mistrust of the US.” It seems, however, that the reasons for Turkey’s growing frustration with its efforts to cooperate with its Western partners, including the United States, run deeper. According to the Huffington Post, Ankara realized several years ago that neither the US nor influential NATO members such as Germany, France, and Britain take Turkey’s security concerns or economic interests seriously. As a result, Ankara decided to go it alone and began “wooing” Russia militarily and Iran economically.

The joint study produced not so long ago by the Turkish Foreign Ministry’s Center for Strategic Research and America’s CSIS, which reviews relations between Ankara and Washington, did not anticipate anything of this nature. The “Arab Spring” had just begun, and few people correctly surmised how that would unfold. Moreover, the study proclaimed that the two countries’ “partnership has recently been enhanced by overlapping perspectives on the unprecedented transformation sweeping the Middle East.” But nothing quite worked out that way.

At that time the foundations for the strategic alliance between the US and Turkey were seen as: close cooperation on issues related to the “Arab spring”; a Turkish role in the NATO mission in Afghanistan; Turkey’s decision to join the NATO missile-defense program; and American assistance with Turkey’s military operations against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

All these elements of their “bilateral rapport” have now turned into factors of their alienation. For example, the Turkish government considers the US government to be fully to blame for the failure of the “Arab spring,” a stance that it takes, apparently, in part in order to sidestep criticism from its own citizens. In any event, there is now no serious cooperation between Ankara and Washington to speak of. Each acts at its own risk and peril. Turkey’s presence in Afghanistan was long ago reduced to a purely symbolic role. And Turkey’s potential purchase of the Russian S-400 system is indicative of more than merely Ankara’s shift toward non-NATO weapons - it is a consequence of the country’s de facto refusal to participate in the NATO program to create a joint missile-defense shield. The S-400 is a missile interceptor that is quite powerful enough to allow Turkey to autonomously defend its own territory.

And there’s a good reason this deal is so irritating to Washington and Brussels. Due to the oscillations of American policy in Syria, the local branch of the PKK - the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) - has suddenly become the US administration’s main bedrock of support there. And this is perhaps the biggest irritant for the Turks. Suffice it to say that the Americans failed to meet their obligation to move the Kurds east of the Euphrates River and out of Manbij and Tabqa. The promise they made to Ankara to disarm the Kurds after the defeat of IS has also been unabashedly left hanging. The Turks deeply dislike being deceived. There is an ever-growing possibility that the US and Turkey, which are “NATO allies,” will become embroiled in an indirect armed conflict (!) through their “proxies” from the pro-Turkish FSA and the pro-American SDF.

Surveys conducted in Turkey by the American Pew Research Center show that 72% of Turks consider the US to be a threat to their country’s security. This is a world record, hands down. Few in Turkey were swayed by Washington’s refusal to formally support the referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan. They don’t think that the Iraqi Kurds would have risked a referendum at all without the Americans’ tacit consent. It is noteworthy that not only Erdogan, but also pro-opposition Turkish nationalists are highly critical of the US Kurdish policy. They believe that by flirting with the Kurds, Washington is pursuing a long-term strategy to create a “second Israel” in the Middle East. They are particularly irritated by the inclusion of oil-rich Kirkuk - which they traditionally view as a Turkmen city - within the zone of the referendum.

One might ask: how enduring are these changes that have been seen in the relationship between the two countries and in the sentiments of the Turkish public? Might they be scrapped once the next generation of politicians gets into office? But it appears rather to be a manifestation of deep-seated patterns of behavior. The post-war threats to Turkey’s security that at one time prompted its close integration with Western institutions, including NATO, simply do not exist today. And they are unlikely to reemerge. The real dangers for Turkey all come from a completely different direction - the Middle East. And to a large extent those dangers can be blamed on the actions of Ankara’s Western allies, who, instead of providing security, have become agents of destabilization. Perhaps the discussion today should be more about finding protection from them, not about joint-defense operations with them.

In addition, by abandoning its dream once and for all of joining the European Union - and that issue can be seen as settled, once and for all, on both sides - Turkey must obviously give some thought to its dependence on NATO. Although there is not yet any talk of Ankara’s pulling out of that institution, it is clearly inevitable that Turkey will reject some of the restrictive commitments and rules mandated by the North Atlantic alliance. Those might chiefly involve decisions to use military force that is unsanctioned by NATO. Erdogan set out to entirely eliminate Turkey’s dependence on defense imports - which includes the goal of launching his country’s own aircraft carrier - by 2023, when Turkey will celebrate the centennial of the founding of its republic.

It’s no secret to anyone that nowadays NATO positions itself as a kind of “introductory class” to prep countries on their path to EU membership. All of Eastern Europe, for example, was forced to pass through this purgatory. It’s no surprise that Austria, Finland, and Sweden, which were early joiners to the European Union, aren’t seriously contemplating becoming NATO members, despite the discussions on this topic that are constantly forced upon them. And as far as Turkey is concerned, without the prospect of joining the EU, that alliance has become too cumbersome and useless.

From the standpoint of Turkey’s real interests, gradual rapprochement with its regional neighbors - Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Russia, as well as with global unions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization - may be more promising. Although some might currently view this drift as a mere episode, it is in fact quite a logical development, based on objective criteria and which may well prove to be long-term.

Cambio de frente

El Imperio del Caos ataca de nuevo. Esta vez le toca a Birmania (ex Burma, actual Myanmar). Los chicos malos del ISIS están siendo trasladados a ese país de Asia con la finalidad de siempre: guerra, caos, destrucción del estado nación. Lo cuenta Thierry Meyssan para Red Voltaire:


Título: ¿Traslado de Siria hacia Birmania?

Epígrafe: El Pentágono está preparando una nueva guerra en el sudeste asiático, ahora contra Myanmar. Los yihadistas presentes en Siria, con el apoyo de varios países del Medio Oriente, y que hasta ahora peleaban entre sí, podrían irse a luchar, junto al Pentágono, contra el ejército birmano y la Premio Nobel de la Paz Aung San Suu Kyi.

Texto: Estados Unidos ha venido destruyendo sistemáticamente todo el Medio Oriente ampliado desde el año 2001. Hace sólo unos días, ese país estaba preparando una nueva guerra contra Irak y Siria a través de los kurdos encabezados por la familia Barzani y Salim Muslim.

Ahora parece tener en mente un nuevo teatro de operaciones: Birmania. En este caso, los yihadistas e incluso varios países del Medio Oriente serían movilizados para ir a luchar en el sudeste asiático.

Hace meses que la prensa internacional viene denunciando la situación de los rohingyas y presentando a Birmania como un infierno, con mentiras similares a las que ya profirió antes sobre Siria.

En 2013, mientras preparaba un ejército en Jordania y financiaba a los yihadistas en Siria, Arabia Saudita creaba también, en La Meca, el «Movimiento por la Fe», rebautizado ahora como «Ejército de Salvación Rohingya de Arakan». Como en el caso de Siria, Arabia Saudita mezcló en ese grupo armado verdaderos birmanos con los mercenarios que habitualmente utiliza en todas partes del mundo. Por ejemplo, el líder de ese grupo es un pakistaní que combatió junto a Ben Laden contra los soviéticos en Afganistán.

Los yihadistas birmanos han recibido su armamento de Estados Unidos y del Reino Unido y su formación militar se desarrolló en campos de entrenamiento situados en Arabia Saudita y Bangladesh. En agosto pasado, su número se estimaba en al menos 5 000 hombres.

Birmania es un país que no ha conocido la paz desde la época de la colonización británica y la posterior ocupación japonesa. Es un mosaico de 135 etnias que se hacen la guerra entre sí –lo cual no ocurre en Siria. Una dictadura militar había llegado a imponer algo parecido a una forma de orden en gran parte de Birmania, recurriendo para ello a una cruel represión. Hace un año y medio, el ejército birmano aceptó compartir el poder con la Premio Nobel de la Paz Aun San Suu Kyi para resolver juntos los problemas interétnicos.

Una de las medidas del nuevo gobierno fue la creación de una comisión de consulta para resolver los problemas de discriminación hacia los rohingyas, comisión que tuvo como presidente al ex secretario general de la ONU Kofi Annan y que contaba entre sus miembros personalidades extranjeras como el ex ministro libanés de Exteriores Ghassan Salamé y varios birmanos, como el guía de un orden sufista.

Al igual que los trabajos de la comisión de la Liga Árabe enviada a Siria en 2011-2012, también hubo sabotaje contra los trabajos de la comisión de consulta creada en Birmania. El mismo día que esa comisión presentó su informe, el 25 de agosto, el Ejército de Salvación Rohingya de Arakan atacó simultáneamente 24 cuarteles del ejército birmano y puestos de la policía dejando un saldo de 71 policías y soldados muertos.

El presidente turco Erdogan comenzó inmediatamente a exacerbar los ánimos en los países musulmanes. Sólo después de sus discursos alarmistas, comenzó la migración de rohingyas hacia Bangladesh.

El objetivo final es movilizar, junto a la OTAN, a los mismos Estados que anteriormente lucharon bajo las órdenes de la alianza atlántica contra los serbios (pro-rusos) en Bosnia-Herzegovina, con la diferencia de que ahora lucharían contra los birmanos (pro-chinos).

Ya existen contactos entre los estados mayores de los ejércitos de Arabia Saudita, Irán, Qatar, Pakistán y Turquía.

Es importante observar que en Irán, el presidente Rohani y el jefe del estado mayor de las fuerzas armadas se pronunciaron a favor de la intervención musulmana mientras que el ayatola Alí Khamenei, Guía de la Revolución, y los Guardianes de la Revolución se pronunciaron contra ese proyecto insensato, con el que Irán se convertiría nuevamente en un vasallo de la OTAN.

Si ese proyecto llegara a concretarse, el conjunto de fuerzas que luchan contra Siria se desplazaría hacia el sudeste asiático. La paz regresaría entonces a Siria, por falta de combatientes.

La hora de la verdad

Una desesperada nota editorial del diario La Vanguardia  de Barcelona da cuenta de lo que se juega hoy en Cataluña. Acá va:


Título: La hora de la verdad

Texto: Carles Puigdemont, presidente de la Generalitat, comparecerá esta tarde ante el Parlament en una sesión crucial para el futuro de Catalunya. La clave de dicha sesión, a partir de la valoración de los datos del 1-O, es la proclamación, o no, de la declaración unilateral de independencia (DUI). Si Puigdemont la efectúa, ya sea de aplicación inmediata o aplazada, ya sea sin aditamentos o aderezada con invitaciones al diálogo o anuncios de elecciones, es más que probable que el Estado responda con la aplicación del artículo 155 de la Constitución y la suspensión de facto del autogobierno catalán. En tal caso, es muy probable que Catalunya entre en una fase de agitación social, turbulencias de difícil control y potencial desastroso. Si, por el contrario, Puigdemont aparca la DUI y prioriza el diálogo y la recomposición sobre una nueva base de las relaciones con el Estado –obviamente, con la imprescindible colaboración de este–, conservaríamos todavía la esperanza de dar con una solución pactada al conflicto. Esta última es la única opción que nos parece deseable.

Hemos dicho y repetido que las soluciones unilaterales no conducen a buen puerto. Menos aún en una sociedad dividida y polarizada, a la que insensatamente se ha privado del 50% de su fuerza. Y que ahora se enfrenta a un horizonte del que, oídos los llamamientos a la movilización y la resistencia, no cabe excluir la violencia ni el conflicto. Tiempo atrás se podía sostener que esto eran sólo negros augurios. Ahora costaría hallar a alguien, en uno u otro bando, que los descartara.

La opción independentista no es hegemónica en Catalunya. Lo sabíamos de antiguo, y también desde el 27-S, que produjo una mayoría soberanista en el Parlament, pero no de votos. Y lo ratificó en la calle el domingo la manifestación convocada por Societat Civil Catalana, que desbordó todas las previsiones. La independencia, que como decíamos ya ha partido en dos a la sociedad catalana, tendrá además efectos perniciosos sobre la economía. Lo comprobamos la semana pasada con los traslados de sedes de Banc Sabadell, CaixaBank, Gas Natural o Agbar. Los reconfirmamos ayer cuando Abertis, Adeslas, Colonial, Cellenx o MRV, entre otras, anunciaron que se iban. El goteo de grandes, medianas o pequeñas empresas que parten es constante. Pero las autoridades económicas catalanas están desaparecidas o minimizan la estampida. Es difícil de entender que personas siempre locuaces callen ahora.

Las economías que prescinden de sus puntales sin pestañear pueden recuperarlos algún día. Pero también pueden ir languideciendo y perder cualquier posibilidad de verlos retornar. Pasó antes en otros lugares. Y, aún suponiendo que regresaran, la imagen que está dando actualmente Catalunya al mundo es la de un suicida. ¿Qué firma extranjera, qué inversor, qué creador de trabajo o riqueza querrá compartir la suerte de Catalunya cuando sus instituciones de gobierno no dan a sus actores económicos las seguridades jurídicas imprescindibles? ¿Quién en su sano juicio puede defender que lo que se le está haciendo a la economía catalana, y al conjunto de los catalanes, es algo positivo o inevitable?

El Gobierno central ha afirmado una y otra vez que no tolerará que una declaración de independencia se materialice. Eso significa que aplicará el 155. El viaje a la independencia quedará entonces abruptamente interrumpido, sus impulsores serán quizás detenidos y apartados de la escena política, todos los catalanes perderemos posiciones y recursos. Quienes pilotan la locomotora independentista son conscientes de ello. Pero siguen adelante. Y dispuestos a pasar el testigo a sus fieles para que estos diriman en la calle las diferencias que ellos no supieron resolver en los despachos. A sabiendas de que eso nos enfrentará y empobrecerá.

Aventurarse hacia la independencia con una mayoría insuficiente, como hizo el Govern, fue un error. Aventurarse, como hizo después, saltándose las leyes, ha sido un error mayor. De poco vale denunciar las omisiones o los excesos del contrario para justificar errores propios de tal calibre. No se puede recurrir al patriotismo para justificar una decisión que dañará a la patria; que causará estropicios –ya los ha causado– en el conjunto de la sociedad, en las infinitas ramificaciones de la actividad económica y en la imagen exterior del país. Por injusto que les parezca a quienes se dejan llevar por determinado entusiasmo, desde instancias europeas es fácil comprender que el Gobierno central aspire a mantener la unidad del país, amparándose en la ley, pero no la pretensión del Govern de proclamar la independencia vulnerando las propias normas y mediante un referéndum sin garantías. La independencia es un proyecto político tan legítimo como cualquier otro, pero pierde su legitimidad cuando se trata de imponer por encima del consenso y de las leyes.

Mientras escribimos estas líneas, es posible que el presidente Puigdemont esté ultimando su discurso de hoy. El ánimo que nos mueve a escribir está meridianamente claro: subrayar la trascendencia de este 10 de octubre del 2017, y las consecuencias que pudiera tener una decisión equivocada y de coste inasumible. Escribimos este editorial porque deseamos que Catalunya restaure su cohesión social y su progreso. Confiando en que esos sean también los deseos del presidente Puigdemont, y en que sepa hallar la vía para evitar la DUI y perfilar un replanteamiento de la situación.

Habrá quienes quieran empujar a Puigdemont a la DUI, a la movilización callejera, a la revolución. Pero eso no es lo que anhela la mayoría real del país, la que abomina del “cuanto peor, mejor” y deplora el enfrentamientos entre ciudadanos. Esa mayoría pide una negociación que genere soluciones duraderas y rechaza por igual la imposición de la independencia y la mano dura indiscriminada para reprimir a sus defensores. No es hora de apostar por la DUI ni por el 155. Ambas soluciones echarían más leña al fuego y tendrían un alto coste. La DUI parece irrenunciable a muchos independentistas. Pese a que se consumiría en poco tiempo, como un fuego artificial, sin tiempo para producir cambios estructurales. El 155 está ya en la recámara estatal. Abortaría la DUI y, de nuevo, tendría un precio elevado para todos los catalanes, pagadero en términos de cohesión, de autogobierno, económicos y acaso de orden mucho más sensible.

Es la hora de la verdad. Estamos al borde del precipicio y no conviene dar un paso al frente. Hoy será un día histórico. Algunos de sus actores creen que además será glorioso. Pero si sus efectos acaban siendo funestos no les aguarda la gloria, sino el oprobio.

Mientras tanto, en el Kurdistán y alrededores...

Es una verdad de Perogrullo decir en estos días que las cosas están cambiando en Medio Oriente. Uno de los factores de este cambio es la repentina importancia de los kurdos en el tablero regional. El reciente referéndum sobre la independencia de los kurdos amenaza con transformar las fronteras entre Siria, Irak y Turquía. Los turcos están nerviosos y comienzan a cambiar su estrategia de alianzas. De todo esto habla la siguiente nota de Savvas Kalèndéridès para Red Voltaire:


Título: Las cosas se complican para el Kurdistán iraquí

Epígrafe: Savvas Kalederides estima que Turquía está reaccionando ante los cambios que pudieran producirse en su frontera, y posteriormente en su propio suelo. La evolución del tema kurdo la empuja a alejarse de los occidentales y acercarse a Rusia.

Texto: Ya lo hemos escrito y repetido varias veces, incluso antes de que todos lo supieran, todo va a cambiar en el Medio Oriente, sobre todo en Mesopotamia, desde la correlación de fuerzas hasta las fronteras de los Estados.

Estamos a punto de ver como se modifican las fronteras de Irak y de que Siria se convierta en un Estado federal.

Los actores determinantes en el terreno y en el trasfondo diplomático de ese proceso, que determinará el futuro de la región quizás por varios siglos, son Estados Unidos y Rusia, mientras que el elemento que cada cual trata de explotar a su favor, para garantizar sus propios intereses estratégicos, es el tema kurdo.

Además, Israel, que debería desempeñar un papel importante –principalmente por debajo de la mesa–, según los cálculos de diplomáticos turcos y árabes, así como de otros países, está tratando de fragmentar los grandes Estados de la región y de crear Estados pequeños «fáciles de manejar», para controlar los recursos energéticos y acuíferos y garantizar al mismo tiempo la viabilidad y la seguridad de su propio Estado.

A lo largo de ese proceso, Turquía, consciente de ser ella misma el tercer país candidato a la federalización –en el mejor de los casos porque el peor implicaría el desmantelamiento e incluso el control de Constantinopla, Esmirna, Mersin y otras ciudades por parte de los kurdos que viven en ellas–, trata de hacerse de nuevas bases geopolíticas y cambiar el curso de los acontecimientos, para evitar lo peor o al menos reducir la envergadura de las consecuencias…

En el marco de esos intentos, Turquía, el mismo Estado que, sin dignarse a contar con el gobierno central de Irak, en Bagdad, firmaba contratos directamente con el gobierno regional kurdo iraquí de Erbil para exportar el petróleo kurdo a través del oleoducto Kirkuk-Ceyhan; la misma Turquía que como ningún otro país, tanto hizo por la administración autónoma del Kurdistán iraquí y apuntaló a Barzani a tal extremo que este último está exigiendo ahora la independencia; esa misma Turquía ahora cambia radicalmente de estrategia y se vuelve hacia Rusia.

Ese es el otro gran cambio que está teniendo lugar después de la modificación, que ya venía preparándose, de las fronteras en los países de la región.

Con la firma en 1926 del Tratado de Ankara con Inglaterra, en el que Mustafá Kemal abandonó todas sus pretensiones sobre Kirkuk y Mosul y aceptó la actual frontera con Irak –frontera que ahora hereda el Kurdistán independentista–, Turquía se vio bajo influencia británica. De hecho, las… las malas lenguas dicen que Kemal estuvo desde el principio al servicio de los ingleses, mientras que el propio Erdogan, en el marco de su retórica de oposición al Tratado de Lausana, dio a entender recientemente que quienes lo firmaron aceptaron –con tal de contentar a los occidentales– una cláusula secreta de desislamización de la nueva Turquía, que dio lugar a secularización, así como a la abolición del califato y de la escritura otomana.

Desde su creación, Turquía ha sido un pilar fundamental de la política occidental en contra de la amenaza rusa, papel que se acentuó con su entrada en la OTAN, en 1952.

Ahora, por tanto, Turquía no sólo modifica radicalmente su propia política hacia su aliado de ayer, Barzani, sino también su opción estratégica primordial de mantenerse geopolíticamente del lado de Occidente.

Todo puede haber comenzado con amenazas y chantajes hacia Estados Unidos y la OTAN para evitar el trago amargo del «tema kurdo». Pero ahora, viendo que el chantaje no funciona, Turquía ha comenzado, con pequeños pasos concretos, a alejarse de la OTAN y está acercándose a Rusia.

La hipótesis y la perspectiva de la compra de los sistemas rusos de misiles antiaéreos S-400, así como el programa de desarrollo autónomo de la industria turca de defensa, son problemas extremadamente serios que seguramente preocupan a Occidente, la OTAN, Washington y Atenas.

Si todo lo que aquí mencionamos se hiciese realidad, los estrategas de Atenas tendrán que darse cuenta de que cada paso de Ankara hacia Moscú acentúa de forma exponencial la importancia estratégica de Grecia.

Susto

Son muchos los catalanes que comienzan a asustarse con el giro que están tomando las cosas en esa nación española. Lo que sigue es el editorial de hoy del respetable diario catalán La Vanguardia. El mensaje es claro y va dirigido a los responsables políticos catalanes: reculen, chicos, porque en cualquier momento volcamos la calesita. La foto de arriba muestra la masiva manifestación de hoy en Barcelona, llevada a cabo por la población anti-independentista.


Título: Nos jugamos Catalunya

Texto: Una semana después de los acontecimientos del 1 de Octubre, el panorama es de una gravedad inaudita. El nombre de Catalunya está escrito en la pizarra de los conflictos que llaman la atención de los poderes de este mundo. Figurar en esa pizarra no es necesariamente positivo, como creen, de manera altamente irresponsable, algunos estrategas del independentismo catalán. “¡El mundo nos mira!”, exclaman. ¿Y qué? ¿Qué sacamos esta vez de que el mundo nos mire? No estamos organizando unos Juegos Olímpicos. Estamos haciendo todo lo contrario de lo que significaron los Juegos Olímpicos de 1992 para Catalunya y España: ahora estamos exhibiendo ante el mundo nuestro desacuerdos, nuestras minorías rotundas que no acaban de ser mayoría, nuestros errores de cálculo, nuestra incompetencia para el diálogo, nuestro potencial conflictivo; quizá nuestra capacidad autodestructiva. Nos miran los poderosos del mundo –cada uno con sus propios intereses y ambiciones–, nos miran los analistas financieros –que no se guían por sentimientos y sonrisas–, nos miran los especuladores y nos miran las aves rapaces. El nombre de Catalunya, y con ella, España, ha sido escrito en la pizarra de los problemas con alto potencial desestabilizador y los mercados financieros no han tardado en reacciones. Los primeros efectos están a la vista.

Los dos principales bancos del país, CaixaBank y Banc Sabadell, se han visto obligados a trasladar su sede social fuera de Catalunya ante la caída del valor de sus acciones y las retiradas de fondos en diversos puntos de España. La decisión adoptada por los dos bancos, imprescindible para la salvaguarda de sus intereses –que son también los intereses de sus clientes catalanes–, ha sido emulada por otras empresas de gran relieve, cotizadas en bolsa, como por ejemplo Gas Natural y Aguas de Barcelona. Centenares de medianas y pequeñas empresas están tomando la misma decisión en el anonimato. Estamos ante un auténtico tsunami de incalculables consecuencias para la economía catalana y para la relación de esta con el poder político. CaixaBank (València), Banc Sabadell (Alicante), Criteria (Madrid), Fundació La Caixa (Palma), Gas Natural (Madrid), Agbar (Madrid).... En cuarenta y ocho horas, la plana mayor de la economía catalana ha trasladado su sede social fuera de Catalunya para protegerse de los posibles efectos adversos de una declaración unilateral de independencia, que sería contestada inmediatamente por el Gobierno central con la activación del artículo 155 de la Constitución y la consiguiente intervención de la autonomía. Tierra incógnita. En el mundo de la economía globalizada, la tierra incógnita es duramente penalizada, sobre todo si se halla a orillas del mar Mediterráneo. Esto es lo que está pasando, desde que millones de personas de todo el mundo vieran a través de la prensa, la televisión y los teléfonos móviles, las duras imágenes del 1 de octubre en Catalunya.

La economía catalana está en riesgo. No sólo las grandes corporaciones. Centenares de pequeñas y medianas empresas también sufren, de manera silenciosa, sin que sus nombres salgan en la prensa, tomando estos días la decisión de ubicar su sede social fuera de Catalunya, a la espera de tiempos mejores. Son muchas las empresas que en estos momentos están viendo disminuir sus pedidos en el mercado español. Es verdad que la economía catalana ya no depende exclusivamente del mercado interior, como hace un siglo, pero sólo desde un fanatismo exacerbado se puede afirmar que España ya no importa para los empresarios catalanes. Eso es falso. Rotundamente falso. Y lo estamos viendo ahora con gran crudeza. Los inversores observan Catalunya con enorme preocupación. El impacto de esta situación en las inversiones extranjeras empezará a conocerse con mayor exactitud dentro de unos seis meses. Se está produciendo una caída de reservas en el sector hotelero. Una “relevante caída de la demanda”, según fuentes del sector. La compañía American Airlines ha recomendado a sus clientes no volar a Barcelona entre el 3 y el 13 de octubre. Algunos cruceros están evitando el puerto de Barcelona. Nos hallamos ante un brutal reverso de Barcelona’92. Una situación nunca vivida.

La situación es grave y no puede minimizarse. Las imágenes del 1-O llamaron poderosamente la atención del mundo y Catalunya ha sido inscrita en la lista de los conflictos peligrosos. Los mercados no priman la incertidumbre y las situaciones sin salida. Los centros de poder internacionales empieza entrever en la cuestión catalana un potencial peligro para la estabilidad e integridad de la Unión Europea. Las imágenes del 1-O y de los días posteriores sugieren la posibilidad de graves enfrentamientos en la calle. Se desvanecen estos días dos de las premisas del independentismo low cost: los mercados no apuestan por la ruptura –todo lo contrario–, y ninguna instancia internacional de relieve se muestra favorable a la mediación, para no desautorizar al Gobierno español. Los mercados reaccionan ante la incertidumbre y los principales gobiernos del mundo apuestan por la estabilidad de España, aunque les disgusten las imágenes del 1-O y tengan serias reservas sobre la política de Mariano Rajoy. Intentar romper la unidad de un Estado miembro de la Unión Europea no es una fiesta mayor, como han sugerido durante años algunos irresponsables que ahora callan. La independencia low cost no existe. A estas horas ya lo sabe toda la sociedad catalana. Sólo los aventureros y los iluminados apuestan por una crisis de alto coste. No puede haber comités invisibles dirigiendo la política catalana en estas horas difíciles.

La situación es grave y no hay que relativizarla. La economía catalana está sufriendo una fuerte sacudida. Aún estamos a tiempo de evitar una catástrofe. Ante esta situación pedimos encarecidamente al presidente de la Generalitat, Carles Puigdemont, a todos los miembros del Consell Executiu, y a todos los diputados del Parlament de Catalunya que actúen con la máxima responsabilidad en las próximas horas. Actúen conforme a su conciencia y desoigan el dicterio de los aventureros. Archiven la declaración unilateral de independencia. El respetable criterio de dos millones de personas no puede llevarse por delante un país de siete millones y medio de habitantes. Propongan un generoso tiempo de diálogo y tomen nota de esos miles y miles de ciudadanos que ayer salieron a la calle, en toda España con divisas blancas, pidiendo concordia y diálogo. Salvaguarden la Generalitat, institución de autogobierno de todos los catalanes. Protejan la economía. Protejan a sus conciudadanos. Actúen con inteligencia. Eviten un drama.

¿Cambio de alianzas en Arabia Saudita?

La foto de arriba muestra al monarca de Arabia Saudita Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud junto con el presidente de la Federación Rusa y líder del mundo libre, Vladimir Vladimírovich Putin, hace dos días en Moscú. La noticia fue mencionada como al paso por la prensa corporativa occidental, si bien los atentos lectores de Astroboy seguramente alzaron las cejas al ver los titulares. ¿De qué va todo esto? La nota que sigue intenta responder la pregunta; fue escrita por Andrew Korybko para el sitio web Oriental Review:

Título: Is Saudi Arabia’s Grand Strategy Shifting?

Texto: Even in this era of global paradigmatic changes, Saudi Arabia’s shifting grand strategy is perhaps one of the most surprising developments to occur thus far, but the fast-moving Russian-Saudi rapprochement is likely to provoke an Iranian “zero-sum” reaction which could complicate Moscow’s multipolar efforts in managing the “New Middle East”.

Most observers were taken aback by what to many seemed to be the inexplicable visit of Saudi King Salman to Moscow this week, wondering how and why the two long-standing Great Power rivals were able to get so close to one another in such a short period of time – and apparently without much public fanfare, too – in making this historic event possible. The usual Alt-Media demagogues decried this as a sellout of Russia’s fundamental national interests, with the most extreme pundit-provocateurs even ranting that it amounts to President Putin siding with “terrorists” such as Daesh and Al Qaeda, especially in light of Moscow’s decision to sell the much-vaunted S-400 anti-air missile systems to Riyadh and even set up a Kalashnikov production plant in the Kingdom.

Had the Saudi Arabia of 2017 been the same country as it was half a decade ago, or even last year for that matter as some could argue, then there might be some rhetorical substance to this outlandish claim no matter how false it would still be, but what most people don’t realize is that Saudi Arabia is in the process of comprehensive changes to its foreign and domestic policies, and that there’s a very high likelihood that it will moderate its traditional behavior in becoming a more responsible actor in international (and especially regional) affairs. A lot of this has happened away from the public eye, at least in the sense that the developments weren’t “sexy” enough to draw widespread attention from most media outlets and commentators, but these piecemeal changes have altogether contributed to the formation of what looks to be a totally new grand strategy.

Russia’s Rationale

Before getting into the details of the drastic policy changes that Saudi Arabia has been up to lately, it’s important to comment a bit on why Russia is embracing its erstwhile nemesis. For starters, Russia’s foreign policy is driven nowadays by the “progressive” faction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which believes that their country’s 21st-century grand strategic ambition should be to become the supreme balancing force in the Eurasian supercontinent. To this end, they’re diligently employing “military diplomacy” and “nuclear diplomacy”; the first in selling arms to rival states in order to preserve the status quo between them and prevent a hot war from transpiring (which is the opposite of the US selling weapons in order to tip the balance in favor of its preferred partner and spark the said conflict that Russia wants to avoid), and the second in utilizing its global leadership in nuclear energy technology to make important strategic inroads with non-traditional partners.

Multipolarity In Action

Concerning Saudi Arabia, this has seen Russia sign deals with it for the S-400 anti-air missile system and Kalashnikov production plant (“military diplomacy”), and Rosatom’s proposal to build Riyadh’s first-ever nuclear power plant (“nuclear diplomacy”). Of course, there’s also traditional and energy diplomacy at play here as well, the former as it relates to cooperation in uniting the Syrian “opposition” as a prerequisite to resolving the War on Syria, and the latter when it comes to both sides’ participation in the historic OPEC+ output deal from last year and subsequent renewal earlier in 2017. Moreover, none of this is occurring in a multipolar vacuum either, as Russia’s premier Chinese partner has been making great strides with Saudi Arabia in the same timeframe, including by inking two sets of deals totaling than $130 billion in the past six months alone.

Riyadh’s Reforms

Most of the Chinese-Saudi agreements were signed in the framework of Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman’s ambitious Vision 2030 project for diversifying away from his Kingdom’s present oil-exporting dependency and towards a more “real-sector” economy. This can’t happen unless crucial socio-cultural reforms are made in Saudi Arabia, and the young prince – who’s far from a fundamentalist Wahhabi in real life and therefore something like a “rock star” among his country’s majority “moderate-prone” youth population (over half of which is under 25 years old)  – recently undertook the pivotal decision to allow women to drive in the future, understanding that this a necessary step to increasing their future participation in the economy. It can be expected that more such reforms might follow in the future, such as the possible reopening of movie theaters and maybe even one day lessening the patriarchal legal restrictions placed on women’s freedom of movement.

Unipolar Pushback

Mohammed Bin Salman’s reforms aren’t without controversy, however, as they’ve produced a lot of resistance among the country’s ultra-fundamental clerical class, as was explained in the author’s recent analysis about “Why Allowing Saudi Women To Drive Is Very Dangerous”. The fact of the matter is that Saudi Arabia isn’t a pure “monarchical dictatorship” in the structural-political sense, but a “dual dictatorship” between the monarchy and the clergy, but the Crown Prince’s socio-culturally modernizing reforms are being perceived of as an unprecedented “power grab” which de-facto constitutes a “soft coup” by the monarchy against the clergy. In turn, the most extreme clerics could become a pressing national security risk if they rally their followers against the monarchy in fomenting unrest, whether manifested through street protests, a royal coup, or terrorism. It’s the fear of this happening which explains the Kingdom’s recent crackdown and the author’s subsequent investigation into “Who’s Really Trying To Overthrow Mohammed Bin Salman?”

 As the aforementioned article concludes, the only serious player with the clandestine competencies to pull this off is the US, which is considering the “Balkanization” of the Kingdom into a collection of emirates aided by the duplicitous connivance of its regional UAE ally. This was elaborated on more in depth by the author in his work a couple of months ago explaining “The Machiavellian Plot to Provoke Saudi Arabia and Qatar into a ‘Blood Border’ War”, but the overriding idea is that the US has had an interest in betraying its decades-long ally ever since the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal was agreed to, which the author predicted in his summer 2015 piece about a “Polar Reorientation In The Mideast” that also described the strategic contours that would eventually lead to the present-day Russian-Saudi rapprochement. It’s this Great Power convergence between Moscow and Riyadh, as well as the latter and Beijing, which is driving the US to wage an incipient but increasingly multifaceted Hybrid War on Saudi Arabia.

Stopping The Saudi “Deep State” Conspiracy

Mohammed Bin Salman must masterfully manage to tame both the radical clerics and domestic terrorists if he’s to have a chance at avoiding a US-backed royalist coup against him. He already has the support of the majority-youthful masses who could come out to the streets to support him in the event of a sudden coup, just like they did for Turkish President Erdogan during last year’s failed pro-US coup attempt, so this infers that he needs to win the backing of the military-security services in order to preemptively suppress clerical-terrorist destabilizations before countering the royalist conspiracy that’s  taking form. However, Saudi forces are embroiled in the bloody War on Yemen, which was one of the first decisions that he made as Defense Minister and is therefore attributed entirely to him, but would have probably happened regardless of whoever was in power at the time due to the geopolitical dynamics involved.

In fact, the author forecast that a forceful Saudi response could be expected to developments in Yemen as early as September 2014 in his article about “Syria’s Yemeni Opportunity and the Rise of the Shia Circle”, which deliberately analyzed events from Riyadh’s sectarian perspective in an attempt to better understand the Kingdom’s future response. Likewise, the follow-up piece in January 2015 about “Yemen: The Saudi Coup That Totally Backfired” presciently concluded that “the Saudis are expected to hit back as hard as they can against the phantom ‘Iranian menace’ that they’re attributing their Yemeni failings to”, and that “no matter which form it takes, it’s not going to be pretty.” In any case, the only way for Mohammed Bin Salman to be confident in the support of his military-security services is to downscale the disastrous War on Yemen and eventually follow the Syrian peace format in resolving the conflict there in as much of a “face-saving” way as possible.

That, however, won’t necessarily endear him to any of the conspiratorial royals who are plotting his ouster, many of whom are reportedly irreconcilably opposed to him for his high-profile foreign policy failings in the aforementioned War on Yemen and Qatar Crisis, which is why the young prince so urgently needed to make up for them with a dramatic success elsewhere, ergo the reason why he decided to commence his country’s now-successful rapprochement with Russia. Conversely, it’s precisely because of his pivotal role in carrying out this game-changing foreign policy rebalancing that the US wants him out, and Washington sent a very clear message to Riyadh of its displeasure just the other day when it announced that it will be halting some of its military exercises with “Gulf countries” until the Qatar Crisis is resolved. Reading between the lines, this is the Pentagon voicing its strong opposition to King Salman’s visit to Moscow and Saudi Arabia’s S-400 deal with Russia, thereby signaling to its in-country proxies that it’s time to commence their planned regime change operation.

All in all, Mohammed Bin Salman is trying to compensate for his earlier errors of judgement in “moderating” his country’s foreign policy to the most realistic extent possible under the present circumstances, which in an historical comparison amounts to an unprecedented pivot of sorts towards the Multipolar World Order.  This doesn’t just have geopolitical implications, however, as there’s the very real possibility that Saudi Arabia might de-dollarize new Vision 2030 and energy contracts with its new non-Western partners, which would in effect equate to the death of the “petrodollar”. The author predicted this in a late-September forecast after it became abundantly clear that the country was no longer as solidly in the American camp as most observers had considered it, especially following its fast-moving rapprochement with Russia and the $130 billion’s worth of deals that the Kingdom signed with China.

The combined effect of these two multipolar realignments, as well as the likely downscaling of the War on Yemen and the “Damocles’ Sword” potential that Saudi Arabia has for dealing a deathblow to the dollar, are increasingly turning Mohammed Bin Salman into the “Saudi Saddam”, in that he’s now being targeted for elimination by the US because this one-time American subordinate was brave enough to chart his country’s own sovereign path in the world. If he can successfully withstand the US-encouraged “deep state” coup against him being waged through the Hybrid War mechanisms of a rebelling clergy, a possible domestic terrorist insurgency (as partial blowback from Saudi Arabia’s support for such groups abroad), and a royalist plot, among whatever other means might soon make themselves available, then it’s expected that the end result will be a considerable moderation of the Kingdom’s destabilizing activities in the region.

Irate Iranians

Background Concepts:

While the welcoming of Saudi Arabia into the multipolar fold as a responsible member of the international community would be celebrated by many because of the far-reaching consequences that it could have in altering the entire course of the New Cold War, there’s one multipolar party which would actually be incredibly irate at this happening, and that’s Iran. The Islamic Republic is caught in an intense security dilemma with the Kingdom, inspired partly by the centuries-old but previously long-dormant Sunni-Shiite split, and also the US’ efforts since the 1979 Revolution and especially after 9/11 to exacerbate this into taking on geopolitical dimensions all across the international Muslim community (“Ummah”). Iran and Saudi Arabia both conceive of international affairs as being a “zero-sum” game between them, and it’s very likely that Riyadh and its media surrogates will intentionally misportray King Salman’s visit to Russia as being against Tehran instead of epitomizing Moscow’s skillful geopolitical balancing act.

It’s understandable if Iran feels uncomfortable with these optics, though it should recognize that Russia’s overall intent is truly apolitical and driven by neutral Great Power considerations, not anything directed against it personally no matter what the forthcoming Saudi psy-ops might infer.

That being said, it’s very tempting to perceive of events through the aforementioned “zero-sum” prism in seeing any betterment of Russian-Saudi relations as being to the overall detriment of Russian-Iranian ones, which in turn might prompt an asymmetrical response or set thereof from Tehran in countering what some of its leadership might truly believe is Russia’s “unfriendly” and “humiliating” gesture by hosting the Saudi King, selling him S-400 anti-air missiles and state-of-the-art Kalashnikovs, and bidding to produce the Kingdom’s first-ever nuclear power plant. This isn’t speculation either, as Iran already isn’t happy with the de-facto alliance that Russia has struck with “Israel” in Syria, which is explained in detail in the author’s earlier work rhetorically questioning whether “Anyone Still Seriously Thinks That Russia And Israel Aren’t Allies?”

Phase 1: Syria

Moreover, Iran doesn’t like how Saudi Arabia is the main reason why it hasn’t been invited to join BRICS, and while the other four members are in a technical sense equally responsible for this too, it’s only Russia which is courting Saudi Arabia in a way which could make Iran uneasy given how impactful the latest rapprochement will be for Syria. Therefore, even though Iran’s official media has been largely silent on the implications of the Russian-Saudi rapprochement, it can’t be ruled out that the millennia-experienced Iranian diplomats are preparing one of their stereotypically asymmetrical responses to what’s happening, and that it could most immediately have consequences for Syria. For example, Iran could make the Astana talks more difficult by siding more closely with Damascus in attempting to rebuff the joint Russian-Turkish efforts to get the Syrian government to enter into certain political-administrative concessions (e.g. a “phased leadership transition” and “federalization”) as part of a comprehensive peace plan that would meet the interests of most external parties to the conflict and therefore maximize Moscow’s geopolitical “balancing” capabilities.

Phase 2: Caucasus

Apart from that and stepping its response up a notch, there’s also the possibility that Iran could work with India to redirect the North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC) from Azerbaijan and Russia to Armenia and Georgia instead, the latter route of which was predicted in the Mideast chapter of the author’s book-length analytical series about “The Chinese-Indian New Cold War” and would allow both on-the-fence Great Powers to pioneer a trade route to the EU. This would be a geopolitically troubling development for Russia and contribute to its perception that Armenia has become an “obstructionist” actor vis-à-vis Moscow-led Eurasian integration processes and has probably been totally taken over by the powerful American-based diaspora lobby, though China’s latest inroads in building its second-largest embassy in the post-Soviet space in Yerevan might help to “balance” everything out in preventing this potential move from being completely disastrous for multipolarity. Nevertheless, if Iran takes this step in rerouting some or all of the NSTC to Armenia, Georgia, and the EU, then it would probably mean that it’s also seriously considering expanding its asymmetrical response to the third phase of operations in the Balkans.

Phase 3: Balkans

The third and final escalatory phase of Iran’s most realistic responses to any perceived “security dilemma” with Russia after Moscow’s rapprochement with Riyadh would be if Tehran seeks to broaden its asymmetrical measures to include energy and geopolitical dimensions in the Balkans. The author wrote about the future role that post-sanctions Iranian energy exports to Europe could have in challenging Russia’s present market dominance in certain regions, and while this might not happen if the EU reimposes sanctions against the Islamic Republic in compliance with American pressure, it still can’t be entirely discounted that Iranian LNG exports to Croatia, Ukraine, Lithuania, and even Poland could be in the cards, as well as its exit from the OPEC+ output agreement. However, the most destabilizing consequence of Iran’s irritability with Russia could be if it decides to return to its post-Yugoslav role in breaking up Bosnia, using the Serbs as stand-ins for the Russians in a new proxy war. That’s the most extreme step that Iran could take and there’s nothing right now which indicates that it will happen, but it should nevertheless be included as the worst-case “dark scenario” forecast.

Concluding Thoughts

Royal Pivot:

Saudi Arabia’s grand strategy is shifting away from its former Western-/unipolar-centric focus to a more diversified one of “multi-alignment’ with multipolar leaders such as Russia and China, motivated in part by the US’ hostile energy and geopolitical actions against it. On the domestic front, Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman is modernizing his country’s socio-cultural situation by enacting belated reforms that will complement his ambitious Vision 2030 project of multisectoral economic diversification away from its present dependency on oil exports. Taken together, the international and domestic dimensions of Saudi Arabia’s grand strategic shifts are expected to have game-changing implications in altering the global dynamics of the New Cold War, to say nothing of what would happen if the Kingdom de-dollarizes its future Vision 2030 and energy deals with its new non-Western partners, hence why the initiator of all of this, Mohammed Bin Salman, is now the “Saudi Saddam” in the sense of being targeted for elimination.

Iranian Reaction:

That’s not all that there is to it, however, since even in the event that the young prince is successful in thwarting his myriad Hybrid War adversaries and the wide variety of weaponized threats that they’re poised to utilize against him, it’s unlikely that this will result in multipolar stability in the Mideast, owing mostly to the fact that Iran is expected to be incredibly irate at its hated rival being feted as a privileged partner by Russia and China. The difference between the two Eurasian Great Powers, however, is that Moscow’s outreaches to Riyadh are having direct consequences for Syria, particularly as it relates to possibly “counterbalancing” or even “rolling back” Iran’s intended post-Daesh influence in the Arab Republic, or so it may seem, which is why Tehran looks much more suspiciously at Moscow than it does at Beijing. The problem, though, is that Russia isn’t doing any of this “against Iran”, but in the “larger multipolar interests” of becoming the supreme “balancing” force in the Eurasian supercontinent, which in and of itself necessitate having excellent relations with Saudi Arabia.

Scenario Forecasts:

If the Iranian leadership is misled into viewing Russia’s ties with Saudi Arabia as part of a “zero-sum” game and not the “win-win” strategy that it’s actually intended (key word) to be, then it’s very likely that the Islamic Republic will resort to one of its stereotypically asymmetrical responses honed by millennia of diplomatic experience in making its silent disagreements well known. This would be an unfortunate development because it would mean that Russia’s sincere efforts to balance and then mediate the Saudi-Iranian/Sunni-Shiite rivalry would be for naught, and that the US’ unstated goal of redirecting Iranian attention away from Saudi Arabia and towards Russia would have been partially successful. Nevertheless, should this happen, then it’s expected that the three-phase tier of escalatory responses could see Iran create “complications” in the Astana peace process; redirect the North-South Transport Corridor away from Azerbaijan and Russia and towards Armenia, Georgia, and the EU; and begin actively competing with Russia for part of the European energy market. At the worst, it might even try to restore its destabilizing influence in Bosnia and spark a proxy war against Russia’s Serbian partners there.

American Backup Plan:

None of Iran’s forecasted responses are certain, or even that it will negatively appraise the fast-moving Russian-Saudi rapprochement in the first place, but in the possible event that it does, then it would inadvertently be playing into the US’ intended strategy of indirectly using Iran as a backup plan for replacing Saudi Arabia in countering Russian interests in the Mideast, Caucasus, and the Balkans. In addition, Riyadh’s reversal from the unipolar camp to the multipolar one would leave the US without a regular source of jihadi recruits, thereby necessitating that it scout elsewhere in such countries as Sudan, India, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. The most likely scenario to happen in the near future is that Iran’s suspicions of the Russian-Saudi rapprochement manifest themselves subtly in Syria, at least at first, while the US begins looking to non-Mideast “Global South” countries for mercenaries while concurrently commencing its regime change operation in Saudi Arabia.

The best outcome would be if Russia’s multidimensional diplomatic efforts could bring Saudi Arabia and Iran together in a “New Détente” like how Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr unsuccessfully tried to do, all the while assisting both of them in warding off the US’ Hybrid War threats, but the most likely result is that this wishful thinking eventuality is still a far way’s off, if it ever happens at all, since the US is well known for flexibly adapting its unipolar grand strategy to accommodate for any multipolar contingency such as this one.