Postales

Tres o cuatro cosas andan pasando por el mundo en estos días: la pandemia, el crack bursátil y posterior "salvataje", la guerra de los precios del petróleo y alguna cosita más. Demasiado temprano como para que asiente el polvo, así que vamos a charlar de otra cosa. El clima de época, por ejemplo. Al respecto, encontramos esta joyita, una serie de postales de Washington en los tiempos que corren. No tiene desperdicio. Lo escribe Fred Reed para el sitio web The UNZ Review. Acá va:



Título: Washington in the Time of Domitian

Texto: As you cross the Fourteenth Street Bridge from Arlington into Washington on a sunny spring day, the vista is magnificent, uplifting. Huge blue sky, brisk wind, the broad brown river flashing in the sunlight. As a portal to the capital of a world empire, it is suitable, even convincing. This new Tiber is at the confluence of the Rio Bravo, Orinoco, and Nile, which has its implications, but never mind. The streams of tourists debouching from the bridge into Georgetown think themselves in the new Rome, a beguiling conurbation of power and glory.

Not everywhere. Amid the blank buildings and empty night somewhere near P Street, a cop finds a blonde woman of maybe forty crawling on the sidewalk. In jeans and sweatshirt, she hugs the rest of a bottle of Jim Beam. She has profusely wet her pants. She sees the cop and says no, no in alarm and begins sprinting for a nearby alley–sprinting to the extent that one can on all fours while clutching a bottle. Blind drunk and nursing a cirrhosis aborning.

The cop walks on. Arresting her would clog the jails, the judge would let her out on recog, and the next night she would be with another bottle. This will not go on forever. She has obvious motor problems and does not crawl well.

In many ways unseen by awed tourists, the city resembles that of Juvenal in corruption, mendacity, and vice. There is the undercity, mostly black, in districts never walked by provincials, angry, hopeless, ready to burn, baby, burn. There is the overcity, discreet behind closed doors, of pols and lobbyists, avaricious, with its Chivas and lines of white powder. The tourists see the middle city of bureaucrats and bartenders and, on the Capitoline, maybe a fleeting glimpse of Newt Gingrich or Mitch McConnnell. “Barb, look, it’s…I think…yes, it’s Newt.”

Occasional fissures appear in the armor of the elite. We now learn of the monied and powerful who thronged to Epstein’s island to frolic in pedophilic lubricity, Bill and Hillary among them. My gracious, the little sweetties would do anything…Is this not purest Caligula?

Ah, the island, shhhh! Here were luscious succulents of sixteen, nymphets fit for the amusement of jaded pols. Yes, nymphettes reconstituted as virgins every morning, their chastity a renewable resource, like the liver of Prometheus. Libido candy, fantasy fodder, worthy to satisfy a British prince. Which they did. Was it Andrew or Charles? I cannot keep them straight, but the Lolitas could. That after all was their job. They were good for a romp on the workbench under hidden cameras, thus fortifying relations between Buckingham Palace and Mossad. There is nothing like video of royalty and underage ginch to clinch a desired treaty with Tel Aviv. Especially so if the princeling has a taste for the more exotic disciplines.

But the yearning public will never know since Epstein, a man of six feet, hanged himself from a bedstead two feet from the floor–or was it three? Presumably by standing on his head.

The understanding of Washington peddles daily on the lobotomy box to the lobotomized of Middle America is properly charming. For example there is Connecticut Avenue lovely over forested Rock Creek Park. Or we see well-swept Capitoline Hill, old and aristocratic. It is as yet only lightly hunted over by predatory black gangs, gathering and hunting. There, in Lincoln Park, Abe in statuary perpetually frees the slaves, which of course he didn’t, but the pols and politically correct control history. All is wholesome.

The public is not invited to see long rows of abandoned Victorian homes, windows boarded over, or whole developments with orifices mostly bricked up and, within, filthy mattresses stained with things better not thought about. There are old needles and remnants of the traditional banquet of shooting galleries, Night Train bottles and empty cans of Vienna sausages.

No. Here is the seat of Empire. All must be seemly. It is only fitting. In the interest of propriety we hide the better class of vice, the suited agents of the arms industry carrying valises of money for waiting congressmen. We hide the crack whores ugly as the corpses they will soon be, and the occasional dead body of an unsuccessful purveyor of drugs. Free enterprise is not without risk.

Across the dark city in Southwest, on Half Street if memory serves, a down-demo gay bar throbs like…never mind. It is small, isolated, an old wooden building. Southwest is not a place where you would see a suburban family with 2.1 perfect children and a Volvo. Macho Man by the Village People thumps from the juke. On the bar a buff and hirsute fag who looks like Sergeant Rock the Killer Marine is dancing naked and teabagging all who volunteer for this service. Which many do. A pair of outrageous queens mince and prance and lisp like Castillian gentry. In the men’s room–there is no other–a gorgeous, slender, nicely curving redhead in a cocktail dress bats her eyes at the urinating inverts. Whether she is a pre-op transexual , a really good TV, or already done isn’t clear. She could pass in any night club in Rome.

In the clean sweep of Connecticut Ave above the Park, prosperous office scum float atop the hidden city, well-dressed, lawyers and office serfs chattering in shi-shi restaurants of the stock market and who is paying what to buy votes in Congress for what legislation. The Indispensable Country never sleeps, not anyway until the bars close.

It is more like Rome than most know. Many blocks away in Shaw, come night, a black transvestite of 230 pounds waits in the bushes. He is built like a running back and wears a thong bikini and size 15 high heels. He is soliciting customers for…it is better not to ask for what.

A passing police car ignores him. Arresting him would entail paperwork, an important consideration near the end of a shift. Besides, the car would smell for days.

Further off, skanks in plastic miniskirts lean against lamp poles, offering a quick-and-dirty stand-up in an alley for twenty bucks. Commerce cannot be crushed, even in Washington.

Around the dogleg on Pennsylvania Avenue the President watches himself on television into the small hours. He is advised by Ivanka, the Palace Athena, who has written of the UK as “the United Kingston.” Athenas these days are not what they were. Her father, Trump Pater, may be a hybrid of Nero and Clarabelle the Clown, but at least he likes big girls.

Across Connecticut from the entrance of the Zoo is a small restaurant that once was a blues bar but has degenerated into a nocturnal hangout for the squalling stupid, chiefly recent graduates of University Shaped Places dedicated to extracting money from the unwise by means of debt slaveery. They talk loudly and vulgarly, the boys coxcombs and the girls honking through their noses like poorly played kazoos. Should the city be attacked by another Hannibal, whom they would think of as Lecter, perhaps they would rush manfully, or personfully, out and smite the invaders with mighty blows of weighty smartphones. My guess is that they would hide under the tables.

Off Dupont Circle in an old brownstone, Black Rose, the local S&M club, holds a party. Under the federal log many things scuttle. A guy, nekkid as a jaybird, is attached to chains dangling from the ceiling while his girlfriend, a nice looking blonde in a catwoman suit, whacks him with a riding crop. Perhaps she is a descendant of Messalina, who was said to have such tastes. No one pays attention. They instead stand around with drinks and talk of bond prices. This is hobbyist kink, played at by people who have known each other for years. They are bureaucrats, legislative assistants, upper middle class but not Congressmen, who do such things more discreetly.

On Cap Hill, a lobbyist’s evening party is in full flood, everyone well lubricated. A reporteress for a local magazine, a pretty brunette, is still there when the cocaine comes out. Normally a journalist would be excluded, but no major figures are present. She has never tried blow. Later she tells her boyfriend, “Fred, that stuff was so good I’ll never go near it again.”

In the Capitol, a Roman dome of an edifice dedicated to the perpetration of democracy, a congressman shepherds constituents through a grip-and-grin in his office. They have come from small towns to be impressed at being in the Capitol. A grip-and-grin is for those less important than those in a squat-and-gobble, more appropriate to homestate bankers than housewives and owners of hardware stores. The effect is that of a Border Collie with a herd of sheep. The legislator smiles convincingly, knowing his craft. He is so glad you could come and so glad to see you, how are things back in East Jesus, a town close to his heart. Wherever the hell it is. Meanwhilehe looks over the shoulder of the hearer to scan the next name tag, a practice well known in the imperial city, a town given to professional sincerity.

To finish this photo album of the imperial capital, we go to the Hawk and Dove, a Hill watering hole, where a pair of minor political mechanics are doing the DC Bob. One leans forward over the table and says, “We’re having more trouble with these goddam…” He ducks his head and looks to the left, then to the right, scanning for possible listeners. There are none. “…goddam affirmative action hires. We can’t get anything done….” The DC Bob.

Mundo Covid-19

Byung-Chul Han es un filósofo surcoreano que vive y trabaja en Alemania (Universidad de las Artes, Berlín). Desde una mirada liberal analiza el fenómeno del Covid-19 y sus consecuencias. No hay una tesis central en su pensamiento, sino más bien apuntes aislados, varios de los cuales resultan interesantes de cara al mundo que viene. No tenés que estar de acuerdo con todo, ni siquiera con la mitad; acercate a un texto que (cosa rara en estas horas) intenta pensar un poco hacia dónde vamos. La nota salió hoy en el diario español El País.


Título: La emergencia viral y el mundo de mañana 

Epígrafe: Los países asiáticos están gestionando mejor esta crisis que Occidente. Mientras allí se trabaja con datos y mascarillas, aquí se llega tarde y se levantan fronteras

Texto: El coronavirus está poniendo a prueba nuestro sistema. Al parecer Asia tiene mejor controlada la pandemia que Europa. En Hong Kong, Taiwán y Singapur hay muy pocos infectados. En Taiwán se registran 108 casos y en Hong Kong 193. En Alemania, por el contrario, tras un período de tiempo mucho más breve hay ya 15.320 casos confirmados, y en España 19.980 (datos del 20 de marzo). También Corea del Sur ha superado ya la peor fase, lo mismo que Japón. Incluso China, el país de origen de la pandemia, la tiene ya bastante controlada. Pero ni en Taiwán ni en Corea se ha decretado la prohibición de salir de casa ni se han cerrado las tiendas y los restaurantes. Entre tanto ha comenzado un éxodo de asiáticos que salen de Europa. Chinos y coreanos quieren regresar a sus países, porque ahí se sienten más seguros. Los precios de los vuelos se han multiplicado. Ya apenas se pueden conseguir billetes de vuelo para China o Corea.

Europa está fracasando. Las cifras de infectados aumentan exponencialmente. Parece que Europa no puede controlar la pandemia. En Italia mueren a diario cientos de personas. Quitan los respiradores a los pacientes ancianos para ayudar a los jóvenes. Pero también cabe observar sobreactuaciones inútiles. Los cierres de fronteras son evidentemente una expresión desesperada de soberanía. Nos sentimos de vuelta en la época de la soberanía. El soberano es quien decide sobre el estado de excepción. Es soberano quien cierra fronteras. Pero eso es una huera exhibición de soberanía que no sirve de nada. Serviría de mucha más ayuda cooperar intensamente dentro de la Eurozona que cerrar fronteras a lo loco. Entre tanto también Europa ha decretado la prohibición de entrada a extranjeros: un acto totalmente absurdo en vista del hecho de que Europa es precisamente adonde nadie quiere venir. Como mucho, sería más sensato decretar la prohibición de salidas de europeos, para proteger al mundo de Europa. Después de todo, Europa es en estos momentos el epicentro de la pandemia.


Las ventajas de Asia

En comparación con Europa, ¿qué ventajas ofrece el sistema de Asia que resulten eficientes para combatir la pandemia? Estados asiáticos como Japón, Corea, China, Hong Kong, Taiwán o Singapur tienen una mentalidad autoritaria, que les viene de su tradición cultural (confucianismo). Las personas son menos renuentes y más obedientes que en Europa. También confían más en el Estado. Y no solo en China, sino también en Corea o en Japón la vida cotidiana está organizada mucho más estrictamente que en Europa. Sobre todo, para enfrentarse al virus los asiáticos apuestan fuertemente por la vigilancia digital. Sospechan que en el big data podría encerrarse un potencial enorme para defenderse de la pandemia. Se podría decir que en Asia las epidemias no las combaten solo los virólogos y epidemiólogos, sino sobre todo también los informáticos y los especialistas en macrodatos. Un cambio de paradigma del que Europa todavía no se ha enterado. Los apologetas de la vigilancia digital proclamarían que el big data salva vidas humanas.

La conciencia crítica ante la vigilancia digital es en Asia prácticamente inexistente. Apenas se habla ya de protección de datos, incluso en Estados liberales como Japón y Corea. Nadie se enoja por el frenesí de las autoridades para recopilar datos. Entre tanto China ha introducido un sistema de crédito social inimaginable para los europeos, que permite una valoración o una evaluación exhaustiva de los ciudadanos. Cada ciudadano debe ser evaluado consecuentemente en su conducta social. En China no hay ningún momento de la vida cotidiana que no esté sometido a observación. Se controla cada clic, cada compra, cada contacto, cada actividad en las redes sociales. A quien cruza con el semáforo en rojo, a quien tiene trato con críticos del régimen o a quien pone comentarios críticos en las redes sociales le quitan puntos. Entonces la vida puede llegar a ser muy peligrosa. Por el contrario, a quien compra por Internet alimentos sanos o lee periódicos afines al régimen le dan puntos. Quien tiene suficientes puntos obtiene un visado de viaje o créditos baratos. Por el contrario, quien cae por debajo de un determinado número de puntos podría perder su trabajo. En China es posible esta vigilancia social porque se produce un irrestricto intercambio de datos entre los proveedores de Internet y de telefonía móvil y las autoridades. Prácticamente no existe la protección de datos. En el vocabulario de los chinos no aparece el término “esfera privada”.

En China hay 200 millones de cámaras de vigilancia, muchas de ellas provistas de una técnica muy eficiente de reconocimiento facial. Captan incluso los lunares en el rostro. No es posible escapar de la cámara de vigilancia. Estas cámaras dotadas de inteligencia artificial pueden observar y evaluar a todo ciudadano en los espacios públicos, en las tiendas, en las calles, en las estaciones y en los aeropuertos.

Toda la infraestructura para la vigilancia digital ha resultado ser ahora sumamente eficaz para contener la epidemia. Cuando alguien sale de la estación de Pekín es captado automáticamente por una cámara que mide su temperatura corporal. Si la temperatura es preocupante todas las personas que iban sentadas en el mismo vagón reciben una notificación en sus teléfonos móviles. No en vano el sistema sabe quién iba sentado dónde en el tren. Las redes sociales cuentan que incluso se están usando drones para controlar las cuarentenas. Si uno rompe clandestinamente la cuarentena un dron se dirige volando a él y le ordena regresar a su vivienda. Quizá incluso le imprima una multa y se la deje caer volando, quién sabe. Una situación que para los europeos sería distópica, pero a la que por lo visto no se ofrece resistencia en China.

Ni en China ni en otros Estados asiáticos como Corea del Sur, Hong Kong, Singapur, Taiwán o Japón existe una conciencia crítica ante la vigilancia digital o el big data. La digitalización directamente los embriaga. Eso obedece también a un motivo cultural. En Asia impera el colectivismo. No hay un individualismo acentuado. No es lo mismo el individualismo que el egoísmo, que por supuesto también está muy propagado en Asia.

Al parecer el big data resulta más eficaz para combatir el virus que los absurdos cierres de fronteras que en estos momentos se están efectuando en Europa. Sin embargo, a causa de la protección de datos no es posible en Europa un combate digital del virus comparable al asiático. Los proveedores chinos de telefonía móvil y de Internet comparten los datos sensibles de sus clientes con los servicios de seguridad y con los ministerios de salud. El Estado sabe por tanto dónde estoy, con quién me encuentro, qué hago, qué busco, en qué pienso, qué como, qué compro, adónde me dirijo. Es posible que en el futuro el Estado controle también la temperatura corporal, el peso, el nivel de azúcar en la sangre, etc. Una biopolítica digital que acompaña a la psicopolítica digital que controla activamente a las personas.

En Wuhan se han formado miles de equipos de investigación digitales que buscan posibles infectados basándose solo en datos técnicos. Basándose únicamente en análisis de macrodatos averiguan quiénes son potenciales infectados, quiénes tienen que seguir siendo observados y eventualmente ser aislados en cuarentena. También por cuanto respecta a la pandemia el futuro está en la digitalización. A la vista de la epidemia quizá deberíamos redefinir incluso la soberanía. Es soberano quien dispone de datos. Cuando Europa proclama el estado de alarma o cierra fronteras sigue aferrada a viejos modelos de soberanía.

No solo en China, sino también en otros países asiáticos la vigilancia digital se emplea a fondo para contener la epidemia. En Taiwán el Estado envía simultáneamente a todos los ciudadanos un SMS para localizar a las personas que han tenido contacto con infectados o para informar acerca de los lugares y edificios donde ha habido personas contagiadas. Ya en una fase muy temprana, Taiwán empleó una conexión de diversos datos para localizar a posibles infectados en función de los viajes que hubieran hecho. Quien se aproxima en Corea a un edificio en el que ha estado un infectado recibe a través de la “Corona-app” una señal de alarma. Todos los lugares donde ha habido infectados están registrados en la aplicación. No se tiene muy en cuenta la protección de datos ni la esfera privada. En todos los edificios de Corea hay instaladas cámaras de vigilancia en cada piso, en cada oficina o en cada tienda. Es prácticamente imposible moverse en espacios públicos sin ser filmado por una cámara de vídeo. Con los datos del teléfono móvil y del material filmado por vídeo se puede crear el perfil de movimiento completo de un infectado. Se publican los movimientos de todos los infectados. Puede suceder que se destapen amoríos secretos. En las oficinas del ministerio de salud coreano hay unas personas llamadas “tracker” que día y noche no hacen otra cosa que mirar el material filmado por vídeo para completar el perfil del movimiento de los infectados y localizar a las personas que han tenido contacto con ellos.

Una diferencia llamativa entre Asia y Europa son sobre todo las mascarillas protectoras. En Corea no hay prácticamente nadie que vaya por ahí sin mascarillas respiratorias especiales capaces de filtrar el aire de virus. No son las habituales mascarillas quirúrgicas, sino unas mascarillas protectoras especiales con filtros, que también llevan los médicos que tratan a los infectados. Durante las últimas semanas, el tema prioritario en Corea era el suministro de mascarillas para la población . Delante de las farmacias se formaban colas enormes. Los políticos eran valorados en función de la rapidez con la que las suministraban a toda la población. Se construyeron a toda prisa nuevas máquinas para su fabricación. De momento parece que el suministro funciona bien. Hay incluso una aplicación que informa de en qué farmacia cercana se pueden conseguir aún mascarillas. Creo que las mascarillas protectoras, de las que se ha suministrado en Asia a toda la población, han contribuido de forma decisiva a contener la epidemia.

Los coreanos llevan mascarillas protectoras antivirus incluso en los puestos de trabajo. Hasta los políticos hacen sus apariciones públicas solo con mascarillas protectoras. También el presidente coreano la lleva para dar ejemplo, incluso en las conferencias de prensa. En Corea lo ponen verde a uno si no lleva mascarilla. Por el contrario, en Europa se dice a menudo que no sirven de mucho, lo cual es un disparate. ¿Por qué llevan entonces los médicos las mascarillas protectoras? Pero hay que cambiarse de mascarilla con suficiente frecuencia, porque cuando se humedecen pierden su función filtrante. No obstante, los coreanos ya han desarrollado una “mascarilla para el coronavirus” hecha de nano-filtros que incluso se puede lavar. Se dice que puede proteger a las personas del virus durante un mes. En realidad es muy buena solución mientras no haya vacunas ni medicamentos. En Europa, por el contrario, incluso los médicos tienen que viajar a Rusia para conseguirlas. Macron ha mandado confiscar mascarillas para distribuirlas entre el personal sanitario. Pero lo que recibieron luego fueron mascarillas normales sin filtro con la indicación de que bastarían para proteger del coronavirus, lo cual es una mentira. Europa está fracasando. ¿De qué sirve cerrar tiendas y restaurantes si las personas se siguen aglomerando en el metro o en el autobús durante las horas punta? ¿Cómo guardar ahí la distancia necesaria? Hasta en los supermercados resulta casi imposible. En una situación así, las mascarillas protectoras salvarían realmente vidas humanas. Está surgiendo una sociedad de dos clases. Quien tiene coche propio se expone a menos riesgo. Incluso las mascarillas normales servirían de mucho si las llevaran los infectados, porque entonces no lanzarían los virus afuera.

En los países europeos casi nadie lleva mascarilla. Hay algunos que las llevan, pero son asiáticos. Mis paisanos residentes en Europa se quejan de que los miran con extrañeza cuando las llevan. Tras esto hay una diferencia cultural. En Europa impera un individualismo que trae aparejada la costumbre de llevar la cara descubierta. Los únicos que van enmascarados son los criminales. Pero ahora, viendo imágenes de Corea, me he acostumbrado tanto a ver personas enmascaradas que la faz descubierta de mis conciudadanos europeos me resulta casi obscena. También a mí me gustaría llevar mascarilla protectora, pero aquí ya no se encuentran.

En el pasado, la fabricación de mascarillas, igual que la de tantos otros productos, se externalizó a China. Por eso ahora en Europa no se consiguen mascarillas. Los Estados asiáticos están tratando de proveer a toda la población de mascarillas protectoras. En China, cuando también ahí empezaron a ser escasas, incluso reequiparon fábricas para producir mascarillas. En Europa ni siquiera el personal sanitario las consigue. Mientras las personas se sigan aglomerando en los autobuses o en los metros para ir al trabajo sin mascarillas protectoras, la prohibición de salir de casa lógicamente no servirá de mucho. ¿Cómo se puede guardar la distancia necesaria en los autobuses o en el metro en las horas punta? Y una enseñanza que deberíamos sacar de la pandemia debería ser la conveniencia de volver a traer a Europa la producción de determinados productos, como mascarillas protectoras o productos medicinales y farmacéuticos.

A pesar de todo el riesgo, que no se debe minimizar, el pánico que ha desatado la pandemia de coronavirus es desproporcionado. Ni siquiera la “gripe española”, que fue mucho más letal, tuvo efectos tan devastadores sobre la economía. ¿A qué se debe en realidad esto? ¿Por qué el mundo reacciona con un pánico tan desmesurado a un virus? Emmanuel Macron habla incluso de guerra y del enemigo invisible que tenemos que derrotar. ¿Nos hallamos ante un regreso del enemigo? La “gripe española” se desencadenó en plena Primera Guerra Mundial. En aquel momento todo el mundo estaba rodeado de enemigos. Nadie habría asociado la epidemia con una guerra o con un enemigo. Pero hoy vivimos en una sociedad totalmente distinta.

En realidad hemos estado viviendo durante mucho tiempo sin enemigos. La Guerra Fría terminó hace mucho. Últimamente incluso el terrorismo islámico parecía haberse desplazado a zonas lejanas. Hace exactamente diez años sostuve en mi ensayo La sociedad del cansancio la tesis de que vivimos en una época en la que ha perdido su vigencia el paradigma inmunológico, que se basa en la negatividad del enemigo. Como en los tiempos de la Guerra Fría, la sociedad organizada inmunológicamente se caracteriza por vivir rodeada de fronteras y de vallas, que impiden la circulación acelerada de mercancías y de capital. La globalización suprime todos estos umbrales inmunitarios para dar vía libre al capital. Incluso la promiscuidad y la permisividad generalizadas, que hoy se propagan por todos los ámbitos vitales, eliminan la negatividad del desconocido o del enemigo. Los peligros no acechan hoy desde la negatividad del enemigo, sino desde el exceso de positividad, que se expresa como exceso de rendimiento, exceso de producción y exceso de comunicación. La negatividad del enemigo no tiene cabida en nuestra sociedad ilimitadamente permisiva. La represión a cargo de otros deja paso a la depresión, la explotación por otros deja paso a la autoexplotación voluntaria y a la autooptimización. En la sociedad del rendimiento uno guerrea sobre todo contra sí mismo.


Umbrales inmunológicos y cierre de fronteras

Pues bien, en medio de esta sociedad tan debilitada inmunológicamente a causa del capitalismo global irrumpe de pronto el virus. Llenos de pánico, volvemos a erigir umbrales inmunológicos y a cerrar fronteras. El enemigo ha vuelto. Ya no guerreamos contra nosotros mismos, sino contra el enemigo invisible que viene de fuera. El pánico desmedido en vista del virus es una reacción inmunitaria social, e incluso global, al nuevo enemigo. La reacción inmunitaria es tan violenta porque hemos vivido durante mucho tiempo en una sociedad sin enemigos, en una sociedad de la positividad, y ahora el virus se percibe como un terror permanente.

Pero hay otro motivo para el tremendo pánico. De nuevo tiene que ver con la digitalización. La digitalización elimina la realidad. La realidad se experimenta gracias a la resistencia que ofrece, y que también puede resultar dolorosa. La digitalización, toda la cultura del “me gusta”, suprime la negatividad de la resistencia. Y en la época posfáctica de las fake news y los deepfakes surge una apatía hacia la realidad. Así pues, aquí es un virus real, y no un virus de ordenador, el que causa una conmoción. La realidad, la resistencia, vuelve a hacerse notar en forma de un virus enemigo. La violenta y exagerada reacción de pánico al virus se explica en función de esta conmoción por la realidad.

La reacción pánica de los mercados financieros a la epidemia es además la expresión de aquel pánico que ya es inherente a ellos. Las convulsiones extremas en la economía mundial hacen que esta sea muy vulnerable. A pesar de la curva constantemente creciente del índice bursátil, la arriesgada política monetaria de los bancos emisores ha generado en los últimos años un pánico reprimido que estaba aguardando al estallido. Probablemente el virus no sea más que la pequeña gota que ha colmado el vaso. Lo que se refleja en el pánico del mercado financiero no es tanto el miedo al virus cuanto el miedo a sí mismo. El crash se podría haber producido también sin el virus. Quizá el virus solo sea el preludio de un crash mucho mayor.

Žižek afirma que el virus ha asestado al capitalismo un golpe mortal, y evoca un oscuro comunismo. Cree incluso que el virus podría hacer caer el régimen chino. Žižek se equivoca. Nada de eso sucederá. China podrá vender ahora su Estado policial digital como un modelo de éxito contra la pandemia. China exhibirá la superioridad de su sistema aún con más orgullo. Y tras la pandemia, el capitalismo continuará aún con más pujanza. Y los turistas seguirán pisoteando el planeta. El virus no puede reemplazar a la razón. Además, es posible que incluso nos llegue encima a Occidente el Estado policial digital al estilo chino. Como ya ha dicho Naomi Klein, la conmoción es un momento propicio que permite establecer un nuevo sistema de gobierno. También la instauración del neoliberalismo vino precedida a menudo de crisis que causaron conmociones. Es lo que sucedió en Corea o en Grecia. Ojalá que tras la conmoción que ha causado este virus no llegue a Europa un régimen policial digital como el chino. Si llegara a suceder eso, como teme Giorgio Agamben, el estado de excepción pasaría a ser la situación normal. Entonces el virus habría logrado lo que ni siquiera el terrorismo islámico consiguió del todo.

El virus no vencerá al capitalismo. La revolución viral no llegará a producirse. Ningún virus es capaz de hacer la revolución. El virus nos aísla e individualiza. No genera ningún sentimiento colectivo fuerte. De algún modo, cada uno se preocupa solo de su propia supervivencia. La solidaridad consistente en guardar distancias mutuas no es una solidaridad que permita soñar con una sociedad distinta, más pacífica, más justa. No podemos dejar la revolución en manos del virus. Confiemos en que tras el virus venga una revolución humana. Somos NOSOTROS, PERSONAS dotadas de RAZÓN, quienes tenemos que repensar y restringir radicalmente el capitalismo destructivo, y también nuestra ilimitada y destructiva movilidad, para salvarnos a nosotros, para salvar el clima y nuestro bello planeta.

Tiempos interesantes

Así abrían los mercados esta mañana. China, tres puntos abajo; Japón, cinco; Europa, seis. En dos horas le toca a Nueva York. Otra: el barril de petróleo cae a U$S 27 (OPEP, fuiste; fracking, fuiste; Venezuela, fuiste). El coronavirus cataliza todos los miedos del presente. El oro sube a U$S 1.680 la onza. "Ojalá te toquen tiempos interesantes", decía la maldición china. Veremos.

Siria y los relatos de Occidente

El mapa de arriba muestra quién controla qué cosa en Siria en estos días. Al respecto, nos topamos con un artículo simple, breve y luminoso aparecido en estos días en el sitio Swiss Propaganda Research. Debido a la gran cantidad de links que ofrece la nota, vale la pena leerla directamente desde su sitio web (https://swprs.org/the-syria-deception). De todos modos, acá va: 


Título: The Syria Deception

Subtítulo: Understanding the geopolitical and psychological war against Syria.

Texto: What is the Syria war about?

Contrary to the depiction in Western media, the Syria war is not a civil war. This is because the initiators, financiers and a large part of the anti-government fighters come from abroad.

Nor is the Syria war a religious war, for Syria was and still is one of the most secular countries in the region, and the Syrian army – like its direct opponents – is itself mainly composed of Sunnis.

But the Syria war is also not a pipeline war, as some critics suspected, because the allegedly competing gas pipeline projects never existed to begin with, as even the Syrian president confirmed.

Instead, the Syria war is a war of conquest and regime change, which developed into a geopolitical proxy war between NATO states on one side – especially the US, Great Britain and France – and Russia, Iran, and China on the other side.

In fact, already since the 1940s the US has repeatedly attempted to install a pro-Western government in Syria, such as in 1949, 1956, 1957, after 1980 and after 2003, but without success so far. This makes Syria – since the fall of Libya – the last Mediterranean country independent of NATO.

Thus, in the course of the „Arab Spring“ of 2011, NATO and its allies, especially Israel and the Gulf States, decided to try again. To this end, politically and economically motivated protests in Syria were used and were quickly escalated into an armed conflict.

NATO’s original strategy of 2011 was based on the Afghanistan war of the 1980s and aimed at conquering Syria mainly through positively portrayed Islamist militias (so-called „rebels“). This did not succeed, however, because the militias lacked an air force and anti-aircraft missiles.

Hence from 2013 onwards, various poison gas attacks were staged in order to be able to deploy the NATO air force as part of a „humanitarian intervention“ similar to the earlier wars against Libya and Yugoslavia. But this did not succeed either, mainly because Russia and China blocked a UN mandate.

As of 2014, therefore, additional but negatively portrayed Islamist militias („terrorists“) were covertly established in Syria and Iraq via NATO partners Turkey and Jordan, secretly supplied with weapons and vehicles and indirectly financed by oil exports via the Turkish Ceyhan terminal.

Media-effective atrocity propaganda and mysterious „terrorist attacks“ in Europe and the US then offered the opportunity to intervene in Syria using the NATO air force even without a UN mandate – ostensibly to fight the „terrorists“, but in reality still to conquer Syria and topple its government.

This plan failed again, however, as Russia also used the presence of the „terrorists“ in autumn 2015 as a justification for direct military intervention and was now able to attack both the „terrorists“ and parts of NATO’s „rebels“ while simultaneously securing the Syrian airspace to a large extent.

By the end of 2016, the Syrian army thus succeeded in recapturing the city of Aleppo.

From 2016 onwards, NATO therefore switched back to positively portrayed but now Kurdish-led militias  (the SDF) in order to still have unassailable ground forces available and to conquer the Syrian territory held by the previously established „terrorists“ before Syria and Russia could do so themselves.

This led to a kind of „race“ to conquer cities such as Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor in 2017 and to a temporary division of Syria along the Euphrates river into a (largely) Syrian-controlled West and a Kurdish (or rather American) controlled East (see map below).

This move, however, brought NATO into conflict with its key member Turkey, because Turkey did not accept a Kurdish-controlled territory on its southern border. As a result, the NATO alliance became increasingly divided from 2018 onwards.

Turkey now fought the Kurds in northern Syria and at the same time supported the remaining Islamists in the north-western province of Idlib against the Syrian army, while the Americans eventually withdrew to the eastern Syrian oil fields in order to retain a political bargaining chip.

While Turkey supported Islamists in northern Syria, Israel more or less covertly supplied Islamists in southern Syria and at the same time fought Iranian and Lebanese (Hezbollah) units with air strikes, but ultimately without success: the militias in southern Syria had to surrender in 2018.

Ultimately, some NATO members tried to use a confrontation between the Turkish and Syrian armies in the province of Idlib as a last option to escalate the war. In addition to the situation in Idlib, the issues of the occupied territories in the north and east of Syria remain to be resolved, too.

Russia, for its part, has tried to draw Turkey out of the NATO alliance and onto its own side as far as possible. Modern Turkey, however, is pursuing a rather far-reaching geopolitical strategy of its own, which is also increasingly clashing with Russian interests in the Middle East and Central Asia.

As part of this geopolitical strategy, Turkey in 2015 and 2020 even used the so-called »weapon of mass migration«, which may serve to destabilize both Syria (so-called strategic depopulation) and Europe, as well as to extort financial, political or military support from the European Union.

What role did the Western media play in this war?

The task of NATO-compliant media was to portray the war against Syria as a „civil war“, the Islamist „rebels“ positively, the Islamist „terrorists“ and the Syrian government negatively, the alleged „poison gas attacks“ credibly and the NATO intervention consequently as legitimate.

An important tool for this media strategy were the numerous Western-sponsored „media centres“, „activist groups“, „Twitter girls“, „human rights observatories“ and the like, which provided Western news agencies and media with the desired images and information.

Since 2019, NATO-compliant media moreover had to conceal or discredit various leaks and whistleblowers that began to prove the covert Western arms deliveries to the Islamist „rebels“ and „terrorists“ as well as the staged „poison gas attacks“.

But if even the „terrorists“ in Syria were demonstrably established and equipped by NATO states, what role then did the mysterious „caliph of terror“ Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi play? He possibly played a similar role as his direct predecessor, Omar al-Baghdadi – who was a phantom.

Thanks to new communication technologies and on-site sources, the Syria war was also the first war about which independent media could report almost in real-time and thus for the first time significantly influenced the public perception of events – a potentially historic change.

Coronavirus

El mapa de arriba muestra los casos confirmados de infección por el Coronavirus en todo el mundo al día de ayer. A esta altura resulta poco creíble que no existan casos en América Latina o Africa (un solo caso en Egipto). Ayer los mercados globales reaccionaron feo ante las noticias sobre la expansión global del virus. Seguimos con cuidado las noticias, que van desde el ninguneo hasta el Apocalipsis. Habrá que ver. Leemos la siguiente nota de James Hamblin para el diario estadounidense The Atlantic:

Título: You’re Likely to Get the Coronavirus

Epígrafe: Most cases are not life-threatening, which is also what makes the virus a historic challenge to contain.

Texto: In May 1997, a 3-year-old boy developed what at first seemed like the common cold. When his symptoms—sore throat, fever, and cough—persisted for six days, he was taken to the Queen Elizabeth Hospital in Hong Kong. There his cough worsened, and he began gasping for air. Despite intensive care, the boy died.

Puzzled by his rapid deterioration, doctors sent a sample of the boy’s sputum to China’s Department of Health. But the standard testing protocol couldn’t fully identify the virus that had caused the disease. The chief virologist decided to ship some of the sample to colleagues in other countries.

At the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, the boy’s sputum sat for a month, waiting for its turn in a slow process of antibody-matching analysis. The results eventually confirmed that this was a variant of influenza, the virus that has killed more people than any in history. But this type had never before been seen in humans. It was H5N1, or “avian flu,” discovered two decades prior, but known only to infect birds.

By then, it was August. Scientists sent distress signals around the world. The Chinese government swiftly killed 1.5 million chickens (over the protests of chicken farmers). Further cases were closely monitored and isolated. By the end of the year there were 18 known cases in humans. Six people died.

This was seen as a successful global response, and the virus was not seen again for years. In part, containment was possible because the disease was so severe: Those who got it became manifestly, extremely ill. H5N1 has a fatality rate of around 60 percent—if you get it, you’re likely to die. Yet since 2003, the virus has killed only 455 people. The much “milder” flu viruses, by contrast, kill fewer than 0.1 percent of people they infect, on average, but are responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths every year.

Severe illness caused by viruses such as H5N1 also means that infected people can be identified and isolated, or that they died quickly. They do not walk around feeling just a little under the weather, seeding the virus. The new coronavirus (known technically as SARS-CoV-2) that has been spreading around the world can cause a respiratory illness that can be severe. The disease (known as COVID-19) seems to have a fatality rate of less than 2 percent—exponentially lower than most outbreaks that make global news. The virus has raised alarm not despite that low fatality rate, but because of it.

Coronaviruses are similar to influenza viruses in that they are both single strands of RNA. Four coronaviruses commonly infect humans, causing colds. These are believed to have evolved in humans to maximize their own spread—which means sickening, but not killing, people. By contrast, the two prior novel coronavirus outbreaks—SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) and MERS (Middle East respiratory syndrome, named for where the first outbreak occurred)—were picked up from animals, as was H5N1. These diseases were highly fatal to humans. If there were mild or asymptomatic cases, they were extremely few. Had there been more of them, the disease would have spread widely. Ultimately, SARS and MERS each killed fewer than 1,000 people.

COVID-19 is already reported to have killed more than twice that number. With its potent mix of characteristics, this virus is unlike most that capture popular attention: It is deadly, but not too deadly. It makes people sick, but not in predictable, uniquely identifiable ways. Last week, 14 Americans tested positive on a cruise ship in Japan despite feeling fine—the new virus may be most dangerous because, it seems, it may sometimes cause no symptoms at all.

The world has responded with unprecedented speed and mobilization of resources. The new virus was identified extremely quickly. Its genome was sequenced by Chinese scientists and shared around the world within weeks. The global scientific community has shared genomic and clinical data at unprecedented rates. Work on a vaccine is well under way. The Chinese government enacted dramatic containment measures, and the World Health Organization declared an emergency of international concern. All of this happened in a fraction of the time it took to even identify H5N1 in 1997. And yet the outbreak continues to spread.

The Harvard epidemiology professor Marc Lipsitch is exacting in his diction, even for an epidemiologist. Twice in our conversation he started to say something, then paused and said, “Actually, let me start again.” So it’s striking when one of the points he wanted to get exactly right was this: “I think the likely outcome is that it will ultimately not be containable.”

Containment is the first step in responding to any outbreak. In the case of COVID-19, the possibility (however implausible) of preventing a pandemic seemed to play out in a matter of days. Starting in January, China began cordoning off progressively larger areas, radiating outward from Wuhan City and eventually encapsulating some 100 million people. People were barred from leaving home, and lectured by drones if they were caught outside. Nonetheless, the virus has now been found in 24 countries.

Despite the apparent ineffectiveness of such measures—relative to their inordinate social and economic cost, at least—the crackdown continues to escalate. Under political pressure to “stop” the virus, last Thursday the Chinese government announced that officials in the Hubei province would be going door to door, testing people for fevers and looking for signs of illness, then sending all potential cases to quarantine camps. But even with the ideal containment, the virus’s spread may have been inevitable. Testing people who are already extremely sick is an imperfect strategy if people can spread the virus without even feeling bad enough to stay home from work.

Lipsitch predicts that, within the coming year, some 40 to 70 percent of people around the world will be infected with the virus that causes COVID-19. But, he clarifies emphatically, this does not mean that all will have severe illnesses. “It’s likely that many will have mild disease, or may be asymptomatic,” he said. As with influenza, which is often life-threatening to people with chronic health conditions and of older age, most cases pass without medical care. (Overall, around 14 percent of people with influenza have no symptoms.)

Lipsitch is far from alone in his belief that this virus will continue to spread widely. The emerging consensus among epidemiologists is that the most likely outcome of this outbreak is a new seasonal disease—a fifth “endemic” coronavirus. With the other four, people are not known to develop long-lasting immunity. If this one follows suit, and if the disease continues to be as severe as it is now, “cold and flu season” could become “cold and flu and COVID-19 season.”

At this point, it is not even known how many people are infected. As of Sunday, there have been 35 confirmed cases in the U.S., according to the World Health Organization. But Lipsitch’s “very, very rough” estimate when we spoke a week ago (banking on “multiple assumptions piled on top of each other,” he said) was that 100 or 200 people in the U.S. were infected. That’s all it would take to seed the disease widely. The rate of spread would depend on how contagious the disease is in milder cases. On Friday, Chinese scientists reported in the medical journal JAMA an apparent case of asymptomatic spread of the virus, from a patient with a normal chest CT scan. The researchers concluded with stolid understatement that if this finding is not a bizarre abnormality, “the prevention of COVID-19 infection would prove challenging.”

Even if Lipsitch’s estimates were off by orders of magnitude, they wouldn’t likely change the overall prognosis. “Two hundred cases of a flu-like illness during flu season—when you’re not testing for it—is very hard to detect,” Lipsitch said. “But it would be really good to know sooner rather than later whether that’s correct, or whether we’ve miscalculated something. The only way to do that is by testing.”

Originally, doctors in the U.S. were advised not to test people unless they had been to China or had contact with someone who had been diagnosed with the disease. Within the past two weeks, the CDC said it would start screening people in five U.S. cities, in an effort to give some idea of how many cases are actually out there. But tests are still not widely available. As of Friday, the Association of Public Health Laboratories said that only California, Nebraska, and Illinois had the capacity to test people for the virus.

With so little data, prognosis is difficult. But the concern that this virus is beyond containment—that it will be with us indefinitely—is nowhere more apparent than in the global race to find a vaccine, one of the clearest strategies for saving lives in the years to come.

Over the past month, stock prices of a small pharmaceutical company named Inovio more than doubled. In mid-January, it reportedly discovered a vaccine for the new coronavirus. This claim has been repeated in many news reports, even though it is technically inaccurate. Like other drugs, vaccines require a long testing process to see if they indeed protect people from disease, and do so safely. What this company—and others—has done is copy a bit of the virus’s RNA that one day could prove to work as a vaccine. It’s a promising first step, but to call it a discovery is like announcing a new surgery after sharpening a scalpel.

Though genetic sequencing is now extremely fast, making vaccines is as much art as science. It involves finding a viral sequence that will reliably cause a protective immune-system memory but not trigger an acute inflammatory response that would itself cause symptoms. (While the influenza vaccine cannot cause the flu, CDC warns that it can cause “flu-like symptoms.”) Hitting this sweet spot requires testing, first in lab models and animals, and eventually in people. One does not simply ship a billion viral gene fragments around the world to be injected into everyone at the moment of discovery.

Inovio is far from the only small biotech company venturing to create a sequence that strikes that balance. Others include Moderna, CureVac, and Novavax. Academic researchers are also on the case, at Imperial College London and other universities, as are federal scientists in several countries, including at the U.S. National Institutes of Health. Anthony Fauci, head of the NIH’s National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, wrote in JAMA in January that the agency was working at historic speed to find a vaccine. During the SARS outbreak in 2003, researchers moved from obtaining the genomic sequence of the virus and into a phase 1 clinical trial of a vaccine in 20 months. Fauci wrote that his team has since compressed that timeline to just over three months for other viruses, and for the new coronavirus, “they hope to move even faster.”

New models have sprung up in recent years, too, that promise to speed up vaccine development. One is the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness (CEPI), which was launched in Norway in 2017 to finance and coordinate the development of new vaccines. Its founders include the governments of Norway and India, the Wellcome Trust, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. The group’s money is now flowing to Inovio and other small biotech start-ups, encouraging them to get into the risky business of vaccine development. The group’s CEO, Richard Hatchett, shares Fauci’s basic timeline vision—a COVID-19 vaccine ready for early phases of safety testing in April. If all goes well, by late summer testing could begin to see if the vaccine actually prevents disease.

Overall, if all pieces fell into place, Hatchett guesses it would be 12 to 18 months before an initial product could be deemed safe and effective. That timeline represents “a vast acceleration compared with the history of vaccine development,” he told me. But it’s also unprecedentedly ambitious. “Even to propose such a timeline at this point must be regarded as hugely aspirational,” he added.

Even if that idyllic year-long projection were realized, the novel product would still require manufacturing and distribution. “An important consideration is whether the underlying approach can then be scaled to produce millions or even billions of doses in coming years,” Hatchett said. Especially in an ongoing emergency, if borders closed and supply chains broke, distribution and production could prove difficult purely as a matter of logistics.

Fauci’s initial optimism seemed to wane, too. Last week he said that the process of vaccine development was proving “very difficult and very frustrating.” For all the advances in basic science, the process cannot proceed to an actual vaccine without extensive clinical testing, which requires manufacturing many vaccines and meticulously monitoring outcomes in people. The process could ultimately cost hundreds of millions of dollars—money that the NIH, start-ups, and universities don’t have. Nor do they have the production facilities and technology to mass-manufacture and distribute a vaccine.

Production of vaccines has long been contingent on investment from one of the handful of giant global pharmaceutical companies. At the Aspen Institute last week, Fauci lamented that none had yet to “step up” and commit to making the vaccine. “Companies that have the skill to be able to do it are not going to just sit around and have a warm facility, ready to go for when you need it,” he said. Even if they did, taking on a new product like this could mean massive losses, especially if the demand faded or if people, for complex reasons, chose not to use the product.

Making vaccines is so difficult, cost intensive, and high risk that in the 1980s, when drug companies began to incur legal costs over alleged harms caused by vaccines, many opted to simply quit making them. To incentivize the pharmaceutical industry to keep producing these vital products, the U.S. government offered to indemnify anyone claiming to have been harmed by a vaccine. The arrangement continues to this day. Even still, drug companies have generally found it more profitable to invest in the daily-use drugs for chronic conditions. And coronaviruses could present a particular challenge in that at their core they are, like influenza viruses, a single strand of RNA. This viral class is likely to mutate, and vaccines may need to be in constant development, as with the flu.

“If we’re putting all our hopes in a vaccine as being the answer, we’re in trouble,” Jason Schwartz, an assistant professor at Yale School of Public Health who studies vaccine policy, told me. The best-case scenario, as Schwartz sees it, is the one in which this vaccine development happens far too late to make a difference for the current outbreak. The real problem is that preparedness for this outbreak should have been happening for the past decade, ever since SARS. “Had we not set the SARS-vaccine-research program aside, we would have had a lot more of this foundational work that we could apply to this new, closely related virus, ” he said. But, as with Ebola, government funding and pharmaceutical-industry development evaporated once the sense of emergency lifted. “Some very early research ended up sitting on a shelf because that outbreak ended before a vaccine needed to be aggressively developed.”

On Saturday, Politico reported that the White House is preparing to ask Congress for $1 billion in emergency funding for a coronavirus response. This request, if it materialized, would come in the same month in which President Donald Trump released a new budget proposal that would cut key elements of pandemic preparedness—funding for the CDC, the NIH, and foreign aid. 

These long-term government investments matter because creating vaccines, antiviral medications, and other vital tools requires decades of serious investment, even when demand is low. Market-based economies often struggle to develop a product for which there is no immediate demand and to distribute products to the places they’re needed. CEPI has been touted as a promising model to incentivize vaccine development before an emergency begins, but the group also has skeptics. Last year, Doctors Without Borders wrote a scathing open letter, saying the model didn’t ensure equitable distribution or affordability. CEPI subsequently updated its policies to forefront equitable access, and Manuel Martin, a medical innovation and access adviser with Doctors Without Borders, told me last week that he’s now cautiously optimistic. “CEPI is absolutely promising, and we really hope that it will be successful in producing a novel vaccine,” he said. But he and his colleagues are “waiting to see how CEPI’s commitments play out in practice.”

These considerations matter not simply as humanitarian benevolence, but also as effective policy. Getting vaccines and other resources to the places where they will be most helpful is essential to stop disease from spreading widely. During the 2009 H1N1 flu outbreak, for example, Mexico was hit hard. In Australia, which was not, the government prevented exports by its pharmaceutical industry until it filled the Australian government’s order for vaccines. The more the world enters lockdown and self-preservation mode, the more difficult it could be to soberly assess risk and effectively distribute tools, from vaccines and respirator masks to food and hand soap.

Italy, Iran, and South Korea are now among the countries reporting quickly growing numbers of detected COVID-19 infections. Many countries have responded with containment attempts, despite the dubious efficacy and inherent harms of China’s historically unprecedented crackdown. Certain containment measures will be appropriate, but widely banning travel, closing down cities, and hoarding resources are not realistic solutions for an outbreak that lasts years. All of these measures come with risks of their own. Ultimately some pandemic responses will require opening borders, not closing them. At some point the expectation that any area will escape effects of COVID-19 must be abandoned: The disease must be seen as everyone’s problem. 

Vacaciones

Algunas noticias llevan títulos tan anodinos que uno se siente tentado a pasarlas de largo. Sin embargo, a poco de comenzar a leer la que posteamos más abajo, nos viene una ola de estupor. Leemos que un eventual plan de paz entre las fuerzas de ocupación de los EEUU y los talibanes de Afghanistán está condicionado a que los talibanes reduzcan la violencia durante siete días este mes. A ver si nos entendemos: después de 18 años de guerra, el Imperio ofrece la paz a cambio de que los talibanes... les den una semanita de vacaciones!!! Leemos en el New York Times:


Título: Trump Gives Conditional Go Ahead on Peace Deal With Taliban, Officials Say

Subtítulo: If the Taliban fulfill a promise to reduce violence, the United States would then sign a deal that would begin the gradual withdrawal of American troops.

Texto: KABUL, Afghanistan — More than 18 years after the United States invaded Afghanistan, President Trump has conditionally approved a peace deal with the Taliban that would withdraw the last American troops from the country, potentially beginning the end of America’s longest war, according to Afghan and American officials.

But the deal will only be signed if the Taliban prove their commitment to a durable reduction of violence over a test period of about seven days later this month. If the Taliban do end hostilities and a deal is signed, the United States would then begin a gradual withdrawal of American troops, and direct negotiations would start between the Taliban and Afghan leaders over the future of their country.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo informed Afghanistan’s top leaders in separate phone calls on Tuesday that Mr. Trump had given tentative approval to this approach, according to a senior Afghan official briefed on one of the calls.

A senior American official aware of the developments also confirmed Mr. Trump had given his preliminary approval for a deal on Monday, dependent on a cessation of violence, the same day he visited Dover Air Force Base to receive the remains of the latest American fatalities in the war, which has killed tens of thousands of Afghans and more than 3,500 American and coalition troops since the United States drove the Taliban from power in 2001.

A senior diplomat in Washington described the deal as 95 percent agreed to in principle, but that the possibility of a final agreement will become clearer in a matter of couple weeks.

A senior Taliban official informed of the negotiations said there were now “positive movements,” but declined to discuss details because the group’s internal deliberations were continuing.

While the move could mark a significant moment in Mr. Trump’s pledge to end what he has described as “endless wars,” the talks have long remained fragile and previously broke down just as a signing was near.

After nearly a year of negotiations, the two sides were on verge of a similar deal last September. Mr. Trump suddenly called off the talks, citing a Taliban attack that killed an American and NATO soldier and nearly a dozen Afghans. But officials said it was largely because Mr. Trump’s grand gesture of inviting the Taliban to Camp David to finalize the deal fell apart.

After that, it took months of trust-building work, including a prisoner swap, to get back to the negotiating table.

The deal’s details — including the timeline of the troop withdrawal and how much of the agreement had changed since the two sides were on verge of a signing last September — remained tightly guarded.

“This is a welcoming development and I am pleased that our principal position on peace thus far has begun to yield fruitful results,” President Ashraf Ghani said in a statement announcing his call with Secretary Pompeo. “Our primary objective is to end the senseless bloodshed.”

Mr. Ghani said Mr. Pompeo had informed him of “notable progress made in the ongoing peace talks” and of the “Taliban’s proposal with regards to bringing a significant and enduring reduction in violence.”

Abdullah Abdullah, the Afghan government’s chief executive who had also received a call, said Mr. Pompeo had “expressed optimism that a reduction in violence and progress with current talks could lead to an agreement.”

For the past month, American negotiators, led by the veteran diplomat Zalmay Khalilzad, have been camped out in the Gulf state of Qatar, trying to persuade the Taliban to come to terms.

The most recent sticking point had been an American demand for the Taliban to significantly reduce their attacks across the country during the signing and after — when the peace process moves to its next stage. The Taliban have signaled their willingness to sit down with the Afghan government and other leaders to discuss the political future of the country — but only after the Americans agree to leave the country.

Aboard Air Force One on the way to the ceremony on Monday at Dover Air Force Base, Mr. Trump discussed his Afghanistan strategy with a small group of aides and supporters, including Ivanka Trump, his daughter, and Senator Rand Paul, a Republican of Kentucky who is among the Senate’s most staunch voices against keeping American troops in Afghanistan.

“I absolutely believe his sentiment is an overall desire not to be involved in a war,” Mr. Paul said in an interview in his office on Tuesday, adding that the president had witnessed a “very emotional” event in Dover the evening before.

Mr. Paul added that while he believed the president wanted to ultimately issue a green light for troop withdrawal, he was skeptical about the amount of support he would receive from his other close allies in Congress.

“We’re dominated by people who want unlimited checks to the military and never-ending intervention,” Mr. Paul said.

La batalla por Eurasia

Posteamos hoy un artículo del oficial retirado del ejército de los EEUU Danny Sjursen, aparecido recientemente en el sitio web AntiWar.com. Los temas que se abordan son ya conocidos por los lectores de Astroboy: Eurasia, potencias marítimas vs. terrestres, las estrategias del Imperio y de aquellos que lo desafían. Acá va:


Título: Beyond Ukraine: America's Coming (Losing) Battle For Eurasia

Texto: Academic historians reject anything smacking of inevitably. Instead they emphasize the contingency of events as manifested through the inherent agency of human beings and the countless decisions they make. On the merits, such scholars are basically correct. That said, there was something – if not inevitable – highly probable, almost (forgive me) deterministic about the two cataclysmic world wars of the 20th century. Both, in retrospect, were driven, in large part, by collective – particularly Western – nations’ adherence to a series of geopolitical philosophies.

The first war – which killed perhaps nine million soldiers in the sodden trench lines (among other long forgotten places) of Europe – began, in part, due to the continental, and especially maritime, competition between Imperial Great Britain, and a new, rising, and highly populous, land power, Imperial Germany. Both had pretensions to global leadership; Britain’s old and long-standing, Germany’s recent and aspirational – tinged with a sense of long-denied deservedness. Political and military leaders on both sides – along with other European (and the Japanese) nations – then pledged philosophical fealty to the theories of an American Navy man, Alfred Thayer Mahan. To simplify, Mahan’s core postulation – published from a series of lectures as The Influence of Sea Power Upon History – was that geopolitical power in the next (20th) century would be inherently maritime. The countries that maintained large, modern navies, held strategic coaling stations, and expanded their coastal, formal empires, would dominate trade, develop the strongest economies, and, hence, were apt to global paramountcy. Conversely, traditional land power – mass armies prepared to march across vast land masses – would become increasingly irrelevant.

Mahan’s inherently flawed, or at least exaggerated, conclusions – and his own clear institutional (U.S. Navy) bias – aside, key players in two of the major powers of Europe seemed to buy the philosophy hook-line-and-sinker. So, when Wilhelmine Germany took the strategic decision to rapidly expand its own colonial fiefdoms (before the last patches of brown-people-inhabited land were swallowed up) and, thereby necessarily embarked on a crash naval buildup to challenge the British Empire’s maritime supremacy, the stage was set for a massive war. And, with most major European rivals – hopelessly hypnotized by nationalism – locked in a wildly byzantine, bipolar alliance system, all that was needed to turn the conflict global was a spark: enter the assassin Gavrilo Princip, a pistol, Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and it was game on.

The Second World War – which caused between 50-60 million deaths – was, of course, an outgrowth of the first. It’s causes were multifaceted and complicated. Nonetheless, particularly in its European theater, it, too, was driven by a geopolitical theorist and his hypotheses. This time the culprit was a Briton, Halford John Mackinder. In contrast with Mahan, Mackinder postulated a land-based, continental power theory. As such, he argued that the "pivot" of global preeminence lay in the control of Eurasia – the "World Island" – specifically Central Asia and Eastern Europe. These resource rich lands held veritable buried treasure for the hegemon, and, since they lay on historical trade routes, were strategically positioned.

Should an emergent, ambitious, and increasingly populated, power – say, Nazi Germany – need additional territory (what Hitler called "Lebensraum“) for its race, and resources (especially oil) for its budding war machine, then it needed to seize the strategic "heartland" of the World Island. In practice, that meant the Nazis theoretically should, and did, shift their gaze (and planned invasion) from their outmoded Mahanian rival across the English Channel, eastward to the Ukraine, Caucasus (with its ample oil reserves), and Central Asia. Seeing as all three regions were then – and to lesser extent, still – dominated by Russia, the then Soviet Union, the unprecedentedly bloody existential war on Europe’s Eastern Front appears ever more certain and explainable.

Germany lost both those wars: the first badly, the second, disastrously. Then, in a sense, the proceeding 45-year Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union – the only two big winners in the Second World War – may be seen as an extension or sequel to Mackinder-driven rivalry. The problem is that after the end of – at least the first – Cold War, Western, especially American, strategists severely miscalculated. In their misguided triumphalism, US geopolitical theorists both provoked a weak (but not forever so) Russia by expanding the NATO alliance far eastward, but posited premature (and naive) theories that assumed global finance, free (American-skewed) trade, and digital dominance were all that mattered in a "Post" Cold War world.

No one better defined this magical thinking more than the still – after having been wrong about just about every US foreign policy decision of the last two decades – prominent New York Times columnist, Thomas Friedman. In article after article, and books with such catchy titles as The World is Flat, and The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Friedman argued, essentially, that old realist geopolitics were dead, and all that really mattered for US hegemony was the proliferation of McDonald’s franchises worldwide.

Friedman was wrong; he always is (Exhibit A: the 2003 Iraq War). Today, with a surprisingly – at least with his prominent base – popular president, Donald J. Trump, impeached in the House and just acquitted by the Senate for alleged crimes misleadingly summed up as “Ukraine-gate,” a look at the real issues at hand in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, demonstrate that, for better or (probably) worse, the ghost of Mackinder still haunts the scene. For today, I’d argue, the proxy battle over Ukraine between the U.S. and its allied-coup-empowered government – which includes some neo-nazi political and military elements – and Russian-backed separatists in the country’s east, reflects a return to the battle for Eurasian resource and geographic predominance.

Neither Russia nor the United States is wholly innocent in fueling and escalating the ongoing Ukrainian Civil War. The difference is, that in post-Russiagate farce, chronically (especially among mainstream Democrat) alleged Russia-threat-obsessed America, reports of Moscow’s ostensible guilt literally saturate the media space. The reporting from Washington? Not so much.

The truth is that a generation of prominent "liberal" American, born-again Russia-hawks – Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden, the whole DNC apparatus, and the MSNBC corporate media crowd – wielded State Department, NGO, and economic pressure to help catalyze a pro-Western coup in Ukraine during and after 2014. Their opportunism seemed, to them, simple, and relatively cost-free, at the time, but has turned implacably messy in the ensuing years.

In the process, the Democrats haven’t done themselves any political favors, further sullying what’s left of their reputation by – in some cases – colluding with Ukrainians to undermine key Trump officials; and consorting with nefarious far-right nationalist local bigots (who may have conspired to kill protesters in the Maidan "massacre," as a means to instigate further Western support for the coup). What’s more, while much of the conspiratorial Trump-team spin on direct, or illegal, Biden family criminality has proven false, neither Joe nor son Hunter, are exactly "clean." The Democratic establishment, Biden specifically, may, according to an excellent recent Guardian editorial, have a serious "corruption problem" – no least of which involves explaining exactly why a then sitting vice president’s son, who had no serious diplomatic or energy sector experience, was paid $50,000 a month to serve on the board of a Ukrainian gas company.

Fear not, the "Never-Trump" Republicans, and establishment Democrats seemingly intent on drumming up a new – presumably politically profitable – Cold War have already explanation. They’ve dug up the long ago discredited, but still publicly palatable, justification that the US must be prepared to fight Russia "over there," before it has no choice but to battle them "over here" (though its long been unclear where "here" is, or how, exactly, that fantasy comes to pass). First, there’s the distance factor: though several thousands of miles away from the East Coast of North America, Ukraine is in Russia’s near-abroad. After all, it was long – across many different generational political/imperial structures – part of the Soviet Union or other Russian empires. A large subsection of the populace, especially in the East, speaks, and considers itself, in part, culturally, Russian.

Furthermore, the Russian threat, in 2020, is highly exaggerated. Putin is not Stalin. The Russian Federation is not the Soviet Union; and, hell, even the Soviet (non-nuclear) military threat and geopolitical ambitions were embellished throughout Cold War "Classic." A simple comparative “tale-of-the-tape” illustrates as much. Economically and demographically, Russia is demonstrably an empirically declining power – its economy, in fact, about the size of Spain’s.

Nor is the defense of an imposed, pro-Western, Ukrainian proxy state a vital American national security interest worth bleeding, or risking nuclear war, over. As MIT’s Barry Posen has argued, "Vital interests affect the safety, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and power position of the United States," and, "If, in the worst case, all Ukraine were to ‘fall’ to Russia, it would have little impact on the security of the United States." Furthermore, as retired US Army colonel, and president of the restraint-based Quincy Institute, Andrew Bacevich, has advised, the best policy, if discomfiting, is to "tacitly acknowledge[e] the existence of a Russian sphere of influence." After all, Washington would expect, actually demand, the same acquiescence of Moscow in Mexico, Canada, or, for that matter, the entire Americas.

Unfortunately, no such restrained prudence is likely, so long as the bipartisan American national security state continues to subscribe to some vague version of the Mackinder theory. Quietly, except among wonky regional experts and investigative reporters on the scene, the US has, before, but especially since the "opportunity" of the 9/11 attacks, entered full-tilt into a competition with Russia and China for physical, economic, and resource dominance from Central Asia to the borderlands of Eastern Europe. That’s why, as a student at the Army’s Command and General Staff College in 2016-17, all us officers focused almost exclusively on planning fictitious, but highly realistic, combat missions in the Caucasus region. It also partly explains why the US military, after 18+ years, remains ensconced in potentially $3 trillion resource-rich Afghanistan, which, not coincidentally, is America’s one serious physical foothold in land-locked Central Asia.

Anecdotally, but instructively, I remember well my four brief stops at the once ubiquitous US Air Force way-station into Afghanistan – Manas Airbase – in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Off-base "liberty" – even for permanent party airmen – was rare, in part, because the Russian military had a mirror base just across the city. What’s more, the previous, earlier stopover spot for Afghanistan – Uzbekistan – kicked out the US military in 2005, in part, due to Russian political and economic pressure to do so.

Central Asia and East Europe are also contested spaces regarding the control of competing – Western vs. Russian vs. Chinese – oil and natural gas pipeline routes and trade corridors. Remember, that China’s massive “One Belt – One Road” infrastructure investment program is mostly self-serving, if sometimes mutually beneficial. The plan means to link Chinese manufacturing to the vast consumerist European market mainly through transportation, pipeline, diplomatic, and military connections running through where? You guessed it: Central Asia, the Caucasus, and on through Eastern Europe.

Like it or not, America isn’t poised to win this battle, and its feeble efforts to do so in these remarkably distant locales smacks of global hegemonic ambitions and foolhardy, mostly risk, nearly no reward, behavior. Russia has a solid army in close proximity, a hefty nuclear arsenal, as well as physical and historical connections to the Eurasian Heartland; China has an even better, more balanced, military, enough nukes, and boasts a far more powerful, spendthrift-capable, economy. As for the US, though still militarily and (for now) economically powerful, it lacks proximity, faces difficult logistical / expeditionary challenges, and has lost much legitimacy and squandered oodles of good will with the regional countries being vied for. Odds are, that while war may not be inevitable, Washington’s weak hand and probable failure, nearly is.

Let us table, for the purposes of this article, questions regarding any environmental effects of the great powers’ quest for, extraction, and use of many of these regional resources. My central points are two-fold:


- first, that Ukraine – which represents an early stage in Washington’s rededication to chauvinist, Mackinder geostrategy – as a proxy state for war with Russia is not an advisable or vital interest;

- second, that Uncle Sam’s larger quest to compete with the big two (Eur)Asian powers is likely to fail and symptomatic of imperial confusion and desperation.


As the U.S. enters an increasingly bipolar phase of world affairs, powerful national security leaders fear its diminishing power. Washington’s is, like it or not, an empire in decline; and, as we know from history, such entities behave badly on the downslope of hegemony. Call me cynical, but I’m apt to believe that the United States, as perhaps the most powerful imperial body of all time, is apt, and set, to act poorest of all.

The proxy fight in Ukraine, battle for Central Asia in general – to say nothing of related American aggression and provocations in Iran and the Persian Gulf – could be the World War III catalyst that the Evangelical militarist nuts, Vice President Pence and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, unwilling to wait on Jesus Christ’s eschatological timeline, have long waited for. These characters seemingly possess the heretical temerity to believe man – white American men, to be exact – can and should incite or stimulate Armageddon and the Rapture.

If they’re proved “right” or have their way – and the Mikes just might – then nuclear cataclysm will have defied the Vegas odds and beat the house on the expected human extinction timeline. Only contra to the bloody prophecy set forth in the New Testament book of Revelations, it won’t be Jesus wielding his vengeful sword on the back of a white horse, but – tragic and absurdly – the perfect Antichrist stooge, pressing the red button, who does the apocalyptic deed.